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INTRODUCTION 
 
A few years back, using the term “few” very broadly, I came across a charitable gift 
catalogue.  Like any other catalogue, it was filled with pictures and descriptions, except that the 
pictures and descriptions were of charitable goods – a goat for a family in Honduras, a blanket 
for a child in Moldova – instead of goods that I might purchase for myself.  I was a junior in 
college, taking Intermediate Microeconomics at the time I was first introduced to charitable gift 
catalogues, and we had just learned that, all else equal, an income subsidy is at least as good as 
an in-kind subsidy from the point of view of the recipient.  But, as I flipped through the pages of 
the charitable gift catalogue, I was presented with the possibility of purchasing in-kind subsidies.  
Why would a nonprofit seek contributions in such a manner?  Perhaps “all else” is not equal 
when one can purchase a charitable gift rather than make a charitable donation.  This theory led 
to Chapter 1 of the dissertation, in which I utilize experiments to test for effects that gift 
catalogues have on charitable giving.  Holding constant various components of a catalogue, I 
find a significant extra effect from the ability to purchase a charitable gift that is not present 
when one can only make a charitable donation.  This extra effect suggests that contributors and 
potential contributors mentally code charitable gifts in a unique way, different from the coding of 
charitable donations.   
While gathering information and designing experiments for Chapter 1, phone calls and 
letters to some of the nonprofits utilizing charitable gift catalogues highlighted another avenue 
for research.  Many charitable gift catalogues offer contributors the ability to make a charitable 
gift purchase in honor of a friend, family member, or loved one, replacing (or augmenting) a 
traditional holiday or birthday gift.  If transforming a charitable donation into a charitable gift 
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can lead to changes in behavior, one might hypothesize that transforming a charitable gift into a 
substitute for a traditional gift (or an addition to it) may also yield differences in contributions.  
For Chapter 2, I test for such an effect again utilizing experiments, and I find that there indeed 
appears to be a significant added effect from framing a charitable gift as a substitute for or 
addition to a traditional gift.  This effect indicates that the transformation is likely causing people 
to mentally code the charitable gift as either a traditional gift or as both charitable and traditional 
gift, perhaps even double counting it.  Part of the effect may be a result of holiday cheer (or lack 
thereof – the holiday was Valentine‟s Day) perhaps altering the glow from giving.   
Finally, while running some pilot experiments for Chapter 1, I noticed some unusual 
behavior among subjects, which led to Chapter 3.  Subjects in the pilot experiment were asked to 
make multiple allocation decisions, dividing money between themselves and charity, and told 
that one of the decisions would be randomly chosen and enacted.  A sizable proportion of the 
subjects engaged in, what I like to call, charitable gambling – they gave large (small) amounts in 
most of the allocation decisions but small (large) amounts in one or two.  In effect, subjects 
created lotteries for themselves.  This risky behavior led to questions about the salience of 
experimental payments when stake sizes or payment probabilities are varied.  The stakes in the 
pilot experiment were small, perhaps leading to risky behavior, but increasing stake size to 
increase risk aversion (the often-assumed outcome of a rise in stakes) is costly.  Could risk 
aversion be increased by increasing stake size but reducing the probability of payment?  For 
Chapter 3 I conduct an experiment to analyze the effects of varying probabilities of payment 
(from 0% to 100%, with 10, 20, and 30% treatments as well) in a high stakes environment.  The 
findings are quite curious.  When the probability of payment decreases, risk aversion 
insignificantly increases, though the sample size is rather small, warranting further study.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
SHOP „TIL POVERTY DROPS?  CHARITABLE GIVING THROUGH GIFT CATALOGUES 
 
1  Introduction 
 In our models of altruism, charitable behavior is often accounted for by one of two main 
approaches.  Both approaches distinguish between a private consumption good and a public (or 
we might prefer “charitable”) good.  In traditional public goods models, contributions arise 
because people care about the good to which they are contributing or the production stemming 
from their contribution (for example, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 1974).  In models of 
impure altruism, contributions also arise because people care about the fact that they themselves 
contributed, providing them with a “warm glow” (for example, Andreoni, 1989, 1990).  
However, the variety of solicitation techniques utilized by nonprofits (and the amount of money 
nonprofits spend fundraising) would indicate that many potential factors affect giving.  While 
these factors may enhance warm glow or provide information about the output of one‟s 
contribution, they may not be fully captured in models of altruistic behavior that allow for only 
one type of charitable contribution.   
For example, if I purchase gifts for an Angel Tree child at Christmas, does my utility 
increase more (or less) than it would if I sent a check to the Salvation Army?  Are toys and 
clothing purchased for a child subtracted from the same account in my budget as a check written 
directly to charity?  Thaler (1985, 1999) provides evidence that people are extremely quirky in 
the way they divide and subdivide their mental budgets, which can yield different accounts for 
different types of transactions, time periods, goods, etc.  A check to the Salvation Army may be 
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drawn from a charity account, however loosely or tightly defined, but what about gifts purchased 
for a child in need?  If I purchase items for a child while at Target running errands, the expense 
may be drawn from a different mental account than if I write a check to charity while paying 
bills.  If utility or even budgets differ when purchasing a charitable gift rather than making a 
charitable donation (of money), we may see differences in the amounts given, and we may wish 
to think about augmenting our current models of altruistic behavior to account for charitable gift 
purchases as well as charitable donations.  Nonprofits appear to assume that distinctions exist 
among different types of charitable contributions, for they continually update their solicitation 
strategies to allow for them, implying that our mental coding, whether applied only to our 
objective functions or also to our constraints, provides opportunities for increased giving.  But is 
there a distinction between a charitable donation and a charitable gift?   
 Intuitively we understand that for some people a difference exists between giving a gift 
and giving money to a friend, family member, or coworker, and research has addressed some of 
the causes and consequences of this difference (for example, Burgoyne and Routh, 1991; 
Waldfogel, 2002; Prendergast and Stole, 2001).  The prevalence of in-kind gifts to those we 
know suggests that such gifts provide more utility for the giver, for the receiver, or for both.  The 
receiver is often unknown in cases of charitable giving, but if the giver derives greater utility 
from giving gifts than from giving cash in general, we should expect to see different contribution 
levels towards charitable gifts than towards charitable donations if traditional gift-giving 
preferences carry over to the charitable setting.   
Burgoyne and Routh (1991) and Waldfogel (1993, 2002) conduct surveys which examine 
gift-giving behavior and the prevalence of gifts relative to cash to and from different sources, 
noting cash gifts, when given, tend to come from relatively older family members and are given 
3 
 
to relatively younger family members, whereas very few cash gifts are given by the young.  The 
reason posited for the former finding is a lack of information about preferences and a desire to 
give utility-maximizing cash gifts rather than in-kind gifts that may be of little use to the 
recipients.  The reasons for the latter include inappropriateness or insensitivity of cash given to 
older recipients and a signaled laziness or uncaring of a cash gift to other young recipients.  
Although the setting and therefore the reasons differ, if norms (or if preferences driving norms) 
from other-regarding behavior towards one‟s family and friends carry over into the realm of 
other-regarding behavior towards strangers, we might expect to see differences in behavior when 
people contribute gifts rather than donations.  If these norms are a result of different degrees of 
warm glow or different estimates of or beliefs about the output of contributions for different 
contribution types, we should expect to see differences in behavior between the younger and the 
older contributors, for the evidence above would indicate that older contributors realize that their 
preferences are not representative so they may attain more utility from donating cash rather than 
purchasing gifts.  If instead norms are driving preferences instead of resulting from them, we 
may not see any differences between the older and the younger in the experiment if they do not 
apply the social norm in the experimental setting.   
Finally, casual observation and conversation indicate that people may give more or less 
towards charitable gifts than charitable donations because the two may be drawn from different 
mental accounts and, if drawn from different mental accounts, the probability of giving or the 
amount given may differ.  Thaler (1999) notes that if mental accounting matters, “a purchase is 
more likely to be made if it can be assigned to an account that is not already in the red.”  Thus if 
charitable gift purchases are drawn from a different account than charitable donations, and one 
account is closer to overdraft than the other, we could see differences in behavior.  This 
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hypothesis is difficult to test, however, because even if we know how much people (and, in 
specific, people of different age groups) give to charity ex post, we do not know which account 
various types of contributions were taken from.  We will keep this hypothesis in the mix as a 
possible contributor to behavior, and later discuss some ways that we might be able to 
distinguish any effects of mental accounting on contributions towards charitable gifts versus 
charitable donations.   
For now, we will focus on finding out if a difference between these two types of 
contribution exists, as a step towards examining the underlying mental coding of charitable gifts 
versus charitable donations (whether in utility or also in constraints) that might lead to this 
difference.  To embark on this quest, we will mimic in laboratory experiments a solicitation 
method that has become quite common among nonprofits.  In recent years, Samaritan’s Purse, 
World Vision, Oxfam International, and Heifer International, among others, have begun to 
provide potential donors with charitable gift catalogues from which they may shop.  Like any 
other catalogue, these catalogues contain pictures, descriptions, and prices (framed as “suggested 
gift amounts”) of items that may be purchased or projects that may be contributed to.  For 
example, from the Samaritan‟s Purse catalogue, I may contribute towards a dairy goat for a 
family in Honduras for $70 or a blanket for a child in Moldova for $6.  Through these catalogues 
a donor is presented with the opportunity to go shopping for a charitable good, which may make 
it feel more like a gift purchase than a donation – like placing any other catalogue order, just one 
for which the good never actually arrives on your doorstep.   
Although filled with information about a nonprofit‟s activities and their costs, which may 
be valuable to donors, a catalogue is presumably expensive to provide.  Additionally, if a 
nonprofit honors the allocations chosen by donors, the organization potentially constrains its use 
5 
 
of funds.  Therefore, an analysis of the effects of catalogue components could be valuable to 
nonprofits, and especially to the recipients of the funds.  The analysis would provide for us 
insight into the behavioral implications of offering the shopping experience to donors – of 
transforming a charitable donation into a charitable gift purchase.  We will conduct this 
transformation through the experiments to see if there is a shift in behavior.  If we find such a 
shift, we will have support for the inclusion of an additional coding distinction in our models of 
charitable behavior – the distinction between donation and gift.  If certain donors are allowed to 
shop, poverty may indeed drop.   
To analyze the effect on contributions from providing potential donors with gift 
catalogues, we utilize laboratory experiments first on a student sample and then on a more 
diverse, online sample.  In the experiments, we hold constant descriptions and pictures of 
charitable goods and vary two components of a catalogue that are crucial to the ability to shop 
for such goods: choice and prices (suggested gift amounts).  Though choice and prices may each 
affect behavior, it is the effect of their interaction that we are most interested in noting.  For, 
choice alone does not comprise a purchase, as one does not know how much one has bought.  
Similarly, even when informed of prices a purchase is not possible, as one cannot choose an item 
to buy.  However, when combined, potential donors are given the ability to shop for a charitable 
gift.  It is the interaction between choice and prices (or the combined effect of choice and prices 
net of the separate individual effects) that we will focus on in this paper, as it will answer our 
main question: Is there a mental distinction between a charitable gift and a charitable donation?  
However, we will discuss to some extent each of the two main components of a gift purchase as 
well (choice and prices), in the hope of refining ideas about their effects on behavior.   
6 
 
Choice in charitable giving, or donor control, has generated much interest in recent 
academic research (Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1997; Duncan, 2004; Seigel, 2006; and Null, 2008).  
Theoretically, we have evidence that under certain conditions choice may increase the level of 
donations by allowing donors to target their preferred bundle of public goods if a charity 
produces more than one (Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1997).  If donors have preferences over 
charitable goods, then we would expect to see giving increase when they can express those 
preferences.  More broadly, economic theory in general would suggest that donors, at least, 
benefit from choice because they can optimize over a larger set.  However, as Thaler (1980) 
notes, the avoidance of regret may cause people to choose not to choose in a variety of settings.  
Wrosch and Heckhausen (2002) note that older people might be prone to experiencing greater 
regret, as they may have less time to change or reverse regrettable courses of action, though they 
find similar intensities of regret regardless of age, noting that recent regrets may still easily be 
addressed and regret management is likely overcoming intensity of long-term regret among older 
individuals.  If regret induces choice avoidance, we should expect to see similar negative effects 
on contributions among older and younger samples.  Additionally, the social psychology 
literature provides evidence that people may experience choice overload when presented with too 
many options, reducing the likelihood that they will choose (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000).  If 
potential donors are faced with too many choices, we might see them refrain from contributing.  
If choice overload is a contributor to behavior, we should expect to see the greatest effects on 
older contributors, as we have evidence that they are more prone to overload (Besedes, Deck, 
Sarangi, and Shor, 2009).   
However, we might also notice negative effects from choice even if donors like to 
choose.  Another model of charitable behavior, Duncan‟s (2004) model of impact philanthropy, 
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suggests that even if public goods are all perfect substitutes, allowing targeted donations to a 
particular project will increase a donor‟s perceived impact and may actually decrease her 
donations.  In this model, a donor cares about the marginal production resulting from her 
personal contribution.  Thus, if donors can target donations to specific projects, perceived 
marginal production is higher for each donor than if they all contribute to all projects.  Consider 
a concave production function for each charitable good.  If a donor is the only contributor to a 
project, marginal productivity is high because the donor is contributing the “first” few dollars 
which attain a higher marginal productivity than the “last” few dollars, which she assumes are 
her contribution when choice is not available (because she is adding her contributions to an 
already large pot).  This higher perceived “impact” may lead to more or less giving because each 
dollar given feels more productive.  Thus, if donors are impact philanthropists, we may see 
negative or even opposing effects from choice, even if donors appear to enjoy choosing.   
The work most closely related to the experiments we will examine here is that of Seigel 
(2006) and that of Null (2008) who both study the effects of donor control or choice in 
experimental settings.  In a field experiment, Seigel (2006) provides donors with two broad 
categories from which to choose, health and education, finding no difference in giving between 
those who can allocate to a category and those who are not given the ability to do so.  However, 
as she notes, subjects may not have noticed the ability to choose, as it appeared in small print on 
the donation form.  Utilizing a within-subjects design, Null (2008) tests for substitution between 
charities when one charity begins to provide choice and another does not.  She finds that subjects 
substitute toward the charity offering choice among two items, though the effect on total 
donations is unknown, as the total allocated to both charities was held constant by design.  In the 
experiments we will examine, the effects from choice are tested using a between-subjects 
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laboratory design with choice among five charitable goods.  The between-subjects design will 
allow us to avoid changes in behavior derived from experimenter effects, and choice among five 
tangible goods will allow for gift purchases in treatments with both choice and prices.  We will 
also be able to compare behavior of different age groups, which will help us to narrow down the 
set of theories pertaining to choice in charitable giving.   
Prices, framed as suggested gift amounts, are another key component of a gift purchase, 
for they allow one to know how much one is contributing in terms of output.  Also popular in the 
literature is the idea that the level and or the number of suggested contributions or membership 
thresholds affects donations, though the studies do not or cannot differentiate effects by age.  
Croson and Marks (2001) find that donations are concentrated around the recommended 
contribution in a public goods game, and Barbieri and Malueg (2010) find that the number of 
membership levels changes total contributions to National Public Radio, the direction of the 
change being a function of the range of incomes, the size of the potential donor base, and outside 
funding.  Additionally, even subtly suggested contributions may affect behavior by establishing a 
norm which influences donors to give more to public radio if previous callers gave more (Croson 
and Shang, 2009; Croson, Handy, and Shang, 2009) and dictators or return-givers to be less 
generous if game norms are altered to allow givers to take (Bardsley, 2008, and List, 2007 
(dictators); Kessler, 2009 (return-givers)).   
To allow for affordability and, thus, purchases of charitable gifts, in the experiments we 
will examine price points are all at or below the endowment provided.  If this induces a low 
norm, we should see a negative effect on contributions.  However, prices in our setting also 
provide information about the efficiency of the nonprofit or the purchasing power of charitable 
dollars.  If efficiency or purchasing power is higher or lower than expected, we could see 
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contributions rise or fall (in either case), depending upon the contributor.  For example, suppose I 
wanted to provide a goat for a family and suppose I would have assumed the cost to be $100.  If I 
see that the price of a goat is actually only $70 and I think $70 is inexpensive, signaling an 
efficient charity or “strong” charitable dollars, I might increase my contribution from $100 to 
$140 and buy two goats, or I might decrease my contributions to $70 and provide just the one I 
was planning to provide.  If the information inherent in prices about the productivity of 
charitable dollars is a significant contributor to behavior, we might see contributions rise or fall 
when prices are provided to potential donors.   
Though choice (or donor control) and prices (or suggested contributions) are each 
commonly used in practice, they are now often combined through charitable gift catalogues.  As 
will become apparent, this pairing leads to interesting interaction effects that suggest a different 
mental coding of charitable gift purchases than of charitable donations, even when the projects or 
goods in question, as well as the charity, remain constant.  To the best of my knowledge, the 
interaction between choice and prices, an interaction which transforms a charitable donation into 
a charitable gift, has yet to be explored.   
We find a negative and significant effect from choice among an undergraduate sample 
and a negative but insignificant effect for the younger half of a more representative sample of 
subjects, though we find an insignificant positive effect for the older half of the more 
representative sample.  The prices or suggested gift amounts in the experiments examined here 
encourage, to some degree, contributions to accrue at the levels provided.  Among the student 
sample and the younger half of the more representative sample, the effect of seeing prices is 
negative (significant for the former, insignificant for the latter).  However, among the older half 
of the more representative sample, the effect from seeing prices is positive (and significant under 
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certain specifications).  Among the undergraduate sample and the younger half of the online 
sample, a positive and significant choice-price interaction exists.  For the older subsample we 
find the opposite result – the interaction between choice and prices is significant but negative.   
The significant interaction effects suggest a fundamental difference between donating to 
charity and purchasing charitable gifts.  To an economist, these results indicate that donors 
differentiate between gift purchases and donations in their objective functions and perhaps also 
in their constraints.  To a nonprofit, they highlight avenues for increasing funds raised by altering 
campaigns to provide donors with more or less (depending upon the person) of a gift purchase 
experience.  To an academic, they direct future work towards the implications of providing 
substitutable traditional and charitable gifts and of bundling traditional and charitable gifts, 
increasingly common strategies.
1
  If charitable gift catalogues can alter behavior by providing a 
gift purchase experience, what will be the result if a charitable gift can replace a traditional gift 
or if it is combined with a traditional gift itself?  These questions will be addressed in future 
work.  For now, we turn to the experiments.   
 
2  Experiments & Results 
After some early pilot experiments aimed at analyzing choice and price effects revealed 
interesting and significant differences in the distributions of donations of various treatments, the 
two experiments we will examine were designed to more fully distinguish among causes for 
these differences, as well as focus more specifically on any effects from the interaction between 
choice and prices (additional information about the pilots appears in Appendix A).   
                                                 
1
 Many nonprofits, including Oxfam and Samaritan’s Purse, allow/encourage gifts in honor of friends or loved ones as 
replacements for traditional gifts, a strategy that will be explored in the next chapter.  World Vision offers tangible gifts 
(such as stuffed animals) to donors contributing to their “Maximum Impact Fund,” gifts that may be kept for oneself or 
given as presents to others, a strategy that will be explored in future work.   
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2.1  Experiment 1 
The first experiment was run in February of 2009 at the University of Colorado at 
Colorado Springs in 2 classroom sessions (introductory economics and sociology) during class 
time with a total of 59 students.  Of those 59, 57 provided the needed controls.
2
  The experiment 
contained four treatments:  neither, choice, price, and both.  To avoid confusion between “the 
control” and “donor control,” all four are called treatments, with the control labeled “neither” as 
subjects neither had choice nor saw prices.  Subjects were randomly assigned to treatments.  In 
all treatments, pictures and five project descriptions were presented to subjects.  Those in the 
choice and both treatments were able to choose among the projects if they wished to do so.  If 
they did not wish to, they could allow the charity to choose for them by selecting the “area of 
most need,” a commonly provided category in actual gift catalogues.  Those in the price and both 
treatments saw prices of the projects, framed as “suggested gift amounts,” listed after the 
respective project descriptions, and also appearing in one additional sentence per project 
description detailing what a contribution of that amount would buy.   
During the experiment subjects made one decision each, deciding how to allocate $20 
between themselves and charity.  Similar to other experiment designs in the charitable giving 
literature, contributions accrued to an actual charity rather than a group account or public good, 
following  Eckel and Grossman (2000, 2003, 2006) and Eckel, Grossman, and Milano (2007), 
who provide subjects with a charity or charities to whom they may donate.  The charity utilized 
for this experiment was Samaritan’s Purse.3  The projects described in the experiment were 
taken from the Samaritan’s Purse gift catalogue and had price points of $4, $6, $8, $9, and $15, 
                                                 
2
 Results improve slightly with the inclusion of the 2 dropped subjects: in Table 3 both p-values reporting differences 
between the both and neither treatments fall, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney into the significant range (0.089).   
3
 Samaritan’s Purse was chosen for three reasons.  First, it guarantees that contributions designated to a particular 
project will be utilized for that project or a very similar project if the project is completed.  Second, it provides a rather 
extensive catalogue, which allowed/allows for other experiments to contain different items while holding the charity 
constant.  Third, the Samaritan’s Purse catalogue was the catalyst for the ideas behind this paper.   
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corresponding to the five most tangible items under $20.  The items were milk, a blanket, a 
soccer ball, baby food, and schooling.  A 50% match was included to encourage contributions in 
the experiment, where they provide data, rather than after it.  Payment envelopes and code 
numbers were utilized to ensure anonymity.  All subject decisions were carried out and subjects 
were offered the ability to confirm this by physically watching as a check was written and/or by 
receiving through their professor an e-mailed receipt of total contributions.  No subject cared to 
exercise this ability.  A post-experiment survey was given to obtain controls (and to satisfy 
curiosity).  Appendix B contains the experiment documents.  A summary of the student 
demographics appears in Table 1.   
 
 
 
 
Treatment All Neither Choice Price Both
Subjects 57 14 14 16 13
Gave in the Experiment 87.72% 100.00% 78.57% 81.25% 92.31%
Average conditional on giving $11.50 $13.57 $12.36 $9.46 $10.50
Unconditional average $10.09 $13.57 $9.71 $7.69 $9.69
Gave to charity last year 70.18% 78.57% 71.43% 87.50% 38.46%
Heard of Samaritan's Purse 19.30% 21.43% 21.43% 18.75% 15.38%
Age 21 20 21 22 19
Male 33.33% 28.57% 35.71% 37.50% 30.77%
Single 87.72% 92.86% 78.57% 81.25% 100.00%
Live with parents 47.37% 28.57% 50.00% 62.50% 46.15%
Help/Pay for college 43.86% 35.71% 57.14% 50.00% 30.77%
Family income < $50,000 29.82% 21.43% 35.71% 43.75% 15.38%
$50,000-$79,999 22.81% 14.29% 21.43% 25.00% 30.77%
$80,000-$109,999 29.82% 42.86% 21.43% 18.75% 38.46%
$110,000-139,999 5.26% 0.00% 0.00% 6.25% 15.38%
$140,000-$199,999 7.02% 7.14% 14.29% 6.25% 0.00%
$200,000+ 5.26% 14.29% 7.14% 0.00% 0.00%
Republican 38.60% 14.29% 50.00% 50.00% 38.46%
Democrat 15.79% 28.57% 14.29% 6.25% 15.38%
Independent 17.54% 28.57% 14.29% 12.50% 15.38%
Other 28.07% 28.57% 21.43% 31.25% 30.77%
White 70.18% 85.71% 57.14% 62.50% 76.92%
Hispanic 12.28% 7.14% 21.43% 12.50% 7.69%
Other 17.54% 7.14% 21.43% 25.00% 15.38%
Religious (1/week or more) 36.84% 21.43% 50.00% 50.00% 23.08%
Religious (1/month or more) 47.37% 35.71% 50.00% 62.50% 38.46%
Catholic 19.30% 21.43% 21.43% 12.50% 23.08%
Protestant 56.14% 35.71% 50.00% 68.75% 69.23%
Table 1:  Subject Characteristics, Experiment 1
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2.2  Experiment 1 Results 
From Table 1, we saw that the average given per subject was $10.09, about 50% of the 
endowment of $20.  This percentage is consistent with that found in similar dictator games in 
which subjects split an endowment between themselves and charity and contributions are 
encouraged via a match (Eckel and Grossman 2003 and 2006).  Conditional on giving, the 
average was $11.50; 88% of subjects gave something in the experiment and 25% gave the entire 
endowment.  We notice from Table 2, which reports giving by subjects (before the match) that 
the highest average given was in the neither treatment, the lowest in the price treatment, with 
choice and both witnessing roughly the same averages.  It would be interesting to note any 
differences in giving by those who chose a specific project and those who had the option to 
choose but refrained.  However, the donation form, rather than listing the particular projects, left 
room for subjects to specify project names.  This apparently caused a little confusion among 
subjects, resulting in some who donated, for example, $6 towards blankets, $6 towards the “area 
of most need,” yet $6 total.  The donation form for the next experiment was improved by listing 
all of the projects along with the “area of most need” to avoid confusion.   
Table 2 provides our first clue that the interaction between choice and prices, inherent in 
a gift purchase, is affecting behavior.  If we were to add up the individual negative effects from 
choice and from seeing prices, we would arrive at a much lower average contribution than we 
found in the both treatment.  If we consider the entire distributions of giving in each treatment, 
we find some differences between the neither treatment and the price treatment in Table 3 which 
reports the p-values from nonparametric equality of distribution tests.  When controls are 
included, we will see even more interesting results appear.   
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We estimate Two-way Censored Tobit and OLS models, the latter both unconditional and 
conditional on giving.
4
  Results are reported in Table 4.  Giving is estimated as a function of 
                                                 
4
 Following the experimental literature on charitable giving (see, for example, Eckel and Grossman, 2003, Karlan and 
List, 2007, Breman, 2009, etc.), which estimates Tobit, Conditional OLS, and/or Unconditional OLS models, we utilize 
all three.  Although the use of OLS would appear to constitute a naïve approach when we consider that there are 
bounds on giving in this experiment, Angrist and Pischke (2009) note that in an environment where 0’s represent 
actual observations rather than censored observations, OLS coefficients may provide useful “average” effects.  
However, there could exist a latent variable taking on negative values if we consider it possible that some people 
would take from charity if allowed.  (Certainly there are people who use address labels sent by charities without 
donating to them which, in some sense, comprises a negative contribution, though the example is a bit of a stretch, 
as those people might prefer that the labels not be sent in the first place.)  Additionally, we witness contributions at 
the upper bound of $20, accounting for everybody who would contribute $20, as well as those who would contribute 
more if allowed.  Since it is plausible that a latent variable, taking on values below 0 or (more likely) greater than 20, 
exists, the Two-way Censored Tobit appears to be a good choice of model.  OLS results are reported as well to 
satisfy readers and to provide a robustness check of sorts.  Conditioning on giving allows us to satisfy those with a 
typical concern about utilizing a Tobit model, mentioned in Wooldridge (2002) – that the effect of a variable on the 
probability of giving is assumed to have the same sign as its effect on the amount given conditional on positive giving.  
Coefficient estimates from the two OLS specifications (and evidence from the figures on the next few pages) indicate 
that the signs are indeed the same for our variables of interest.   
Neither  treatment (14) $13.57 Price  treatment (16) 7.69***
     Donors (14) $13.57      Donors (13) 9.46^^
Choice  treatment (14) 9.71* Both  treatment (13) 9.69*
     Donors (11) $12.36      Donors (12) $10.50
Table 2:  Average Giving by Treatment
***, **, and * denote significant differences from the neither 
treatment at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed t-tests).  Carats 
are used similarly to denote differences conditional on giving.  The 
number of subjects in each group is in parentheses.  
0.277 0.028 0.154 WMW
0.343 0.060 0.343 KS
0.833 0.883 WMW
0.656 0.525 KS
0.611 WMW
0.855 KS
Price Both
Neither
Choice
Table 3:  Distribution Tests
p-values reported from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
(WMW) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests.  
Price
Choice
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treatment indicators as well as binary controls included to account for gender, religiousity,
5
 
political affiliation, singleness, the responsibility of college expenses, ethnicity, family income, 
living arrangements, whether the individual gave to charity at all last year (many knew they gave 
but not how much), and religious affiliation, loosely categorized.  Age was also included as a 
control.
6
  Income data were categorical with a median category of $50,000-$79,000 which 
contained 13 individuals.  Since median household income ($52,175) reported by the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2006-2008 American Community Survey) falls within this interval, two binary 
income variables were utilized, one for income of $50,000 or greater and one for income of 
$80,000 or greater.  As results are similar in either case, we only report results utilizing the latter, 
since it more evenly splits the sample (53% below and 47% above).  An indicator for awareness 
of Samaritan’s Purse is included as well but it is not significant; results remain similar if it is 
dropped.   
 
                                                 
5
 Religiousity is defined as attending services, gatherings, or studies once or more per week, similar to Brooks 
(2006).  While this definition is relatively Christian-centric, both datasets are largely composed of subjects falling 
under the category of “Christian” or no category at all, with very few from other faiths.  Thus, the definition of 
“religious” as attending on a weekly basis seems reasonable.   
6
 Since this sample was comprised of students, there was relatively little variation in age, though some did exist since 
the University attracts a sizable proportion of nontraditional students.  Including or excluding age and age squared 
yields similar results.  They are included here because we have evidence that the relationship between age and 
giving is quadratic (Clotfelter, 2002) and because of the presence of some nontraditional students in the sample.   
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When we account for controls, we see that both choice and prices have significant 
negative effects on giving but their combination diminishes the individual negative effects, 
suggesting that the ability to purchase a charitable gift alters the transaction in the minds of 
Dependent Variable:  
Tobit Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Choice treatment -10.19** -7.247** -4.809 Choice -10.19** -7.247** -4.809
(3.770)         (2.962)         (2.916)         (3.770)         (2.962)         (2.916)         
Price treatment -11.23*** -8.260*** -7.753*** Price -11.23*** -8.260*** -7.753***
(3.190)         (2.439)         (2.306)         (3.190)         (2.439)         (2.306)         
Both treatment -6.001* -4.608* -3.135 Choice*Price 15.42*** 10.90*** 9.427**
(3.322)         (2.355)         (1.937)         (4.517)         (3.660)         (3.850)         
Age 2.692 1.787 -3.613 2.692 1.787 -3.613
(2.371)         (1.791)         (2.426)         (2.371)         (1.791)         (2.426)         
Age squared -0.041 -0.025 0.069 -0.041 -0.025 0.069
(0.035)         (0.026)         (0.042)         (0.035)         (0.026)         (0.042)         
Male -10.45*** -6.421*** -5.062** -10.45*** -6.421*** -5.062**
(2.425)         (1.705)         (2.318)         (2.425)         (1.705)         (2.318)         
Religious 8.107*** 5.456** 7.406*** 8.107*** 5.456** 7.406***
(2.789)         (2.353)         (2.367)         (2.789)         (2.353)         (2.367)         
Republican 8.231*** 5.706** 5.685** 8.231*** 5.706** 5.685**
(2.916)         (2.322)         (2.318)         (2.916)         (2.322)         (2.318)         
Democrat 12.18*** 7.955** 12.46*** 12.18*** 7.955** 12.46***
(4.154)         (2.968)         (2.328)         (4.154)         (2.968)         (2.328)         
Independent 10.06** 6.632** 7.247** 10.06** 6.632** 7.247**
(3.844)         (3.108)         (3.545)         (3.844)         (3.108)         (3.545)         
Single -8.519 -3.106 -5.438 -8.519 -3.106 -5.438
(6.135)         (4.582)         (4.512)         (6.135)         (4.582)         (4.512)         
Live with parents 4.364 2.300 3.726* 4.364 2.300 3.726*
(2.716)         (2.092)         (2.037)         (2.716)         (2.092)         (2.037)         
Help/pay for college -6.151** -4.087** -2.928 -6.151** -4.087** -2.928
(2.639)         (2.003)         (1.911)         (2.639)         (2.003)         (1.911)         
Family income > $80K -0.894 -1.863 -1.995 -0.894 -1.863 -1.995
(2.320)         (1.746)         (2.041)         (2.320)         (1.746)         (2.041)         
Gave at all last year -3.760 -2.310 -1.669 -3.760 -2.310 -1.669
(2.589)         (1.944)         (1.796)         (2.589)         (1.944)         (1.796)         
White -6.280* -4.870* -2.133 -6.280* -4.870* -2.133
(3.236)         (2.490)         (2.310)         (3.236)         (2.490)         (2.310)         
Catholic -3.536 -2.409 -4.983* -3.536 -2.409 -4.983*
(4.074)         (3.348)         (2.881)         (4.074)         (3.348)         (2.881)         
Protestant 0.491 0.287 -2.186 0.491 0.287 -2.186
(3.226)         (2.622)         (2.567)         (3.226)         (2.622)         (2.567)         
Heard of SP 2.376 1.586 1.959 2.376 1.586 1.959
(2.858)         (2.363)         (2.413)         (2.858)         (2.363)         (2.413)         
Constant -10.320 -5.502 62.31* -10.320 -5.502 62.31*
(35.750)       (27.610)       (33.930)       (35.750)       (27.610)       (33.930)       
Pseudo/R-squared 0.15 0.57 0.61 0.15 0.57 0.61
Prob > F 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 57 57 50 57 57 50
7 left-censored, 36 uncensored, 14 right-censored.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table 4:  Regression Results, Unconditional and Conditional on Giving
Amount Given
OLS OLS
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potential donors.  While the first three columns in Table 4 include treatment indicators, the last 
three include an indicator for choice (which is allowed in two treatments), for prices (which 
appear in two treatments), and for the interaction between choice and prices (which is only 
present in the both treatment).  The coefficient on the interaction term provides a positive and 
significant estimate for the effect of transforming a charitable donation into a charitable gift, 
holding constant the effects of choice and prices.  We also notice that the men in this sample are 
less generous than the women, the religious more generous than the non-religious, and the 
politically-defined more generous than those reporting no particular political 
preference/affiliation, while white subjects and subjects who are paying or helping to pay college 
expenses give somewhat less.
7
   
Specifications (3) and (6) report coefficient estimates conditional on giving.  Two of our 
main results weaken, indicating that some of the effects, especially the effects of choice, are 
derived from changes on the extensive margin.  That is, the negative effect from choice is 
stemming in large part from a decrease in the probability of contributing, while the negative 
effect from prices is affecting both the probability of contributing and the level of contributions.  
The positive interaction effect is slightly weaker in specification (6) indicating a small degree of 
change on the extensive margin as well, evidence that the interaction encourages to some extent 
a higher probability of contributing, along with higher levels of contribution.  Graphical analyses 
included below provide additional insight into regression findings.   
Looking at Figures 1 and 2, which contain cumulative distribution functions and 
probability density functions by treatment, we can see that the choice, price, and both treatments 
resulted in relatively high frequencies of low donation amounts, the price treatment especially 
                                                 
7
 As Table 4 indicates, controls significantly affect giving.  If we were to drop all controls, we would lose significance 
on our coefficients of interest, however, this is not due to any one control driving results.  Results similar to those 
reported in Table 4 are found with much shorter, and varied, lists of controls.   
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so.  Indeed, the distribution of contributions in the price treatment is almost stochastically 
dominated by the distribution of contributions in the both treatment and is stochastically 
dominated by the distribution of contributions in the neither treatment: for any given level of 
contributions, the price treatment witnesses a larger percentage of subjects giving less than that 
level (or equivalently, the neither treatment witnesses a larger percentage of subjects giving more 
than that level).  Similarly, the distribution of contributions in the neither treatment almost 
dominates the distribution in the both treatment and does dominate the distribution in the choice 
treatment.   
 
 
Figure 1:  CDF‟s of Contribution Amounts: % of Subjects Contributing $X or Less, by Treatment 
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Figure 2:  PDF‟s of Contribution Amounts: % of Subjects Contributing Each Amount, by Treatment 
 
The negative effect from choice is somewhat surprising given the positive or insignificant 
effects found in the literature so far (Seigel (2006) and Null (2008)), and given that many 
subjects appear to like choice – they choose even when they don‟t have to – though such a 
finding is consistent with Duncan‟s (2004) model of impact philanthropy.  However, we also see 
that some of the negative effect is deriving from more $0 contributions in the choice treatment, 
indicating that choice overload may be present, potentially even causing some subjects to refrain 
from giving as well as from choosing, similar to behavior found by Iyengar and Lepper (2000), 
who noted that when faced with too many jam choices, more potential consumers refrain from 
purchasing than when faced with fewer choices.  The number of choices presented here is 
relatively small, so perhaps even the single choice of whether or not to choose – that is, the 
choice between choosing or donating to the area of most need – imposes some cost that subjects 
avoid by refusing to give altogether.  Additionally, if the decision between a blanket for one 
child and food for another is expected to be mentally or emotionally difficult to justify ex post, 
one might refrain from making the choice, or any choice, ex ante, to avoid regret.   
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Comparing the price treatment with the neither treatment and comparing the both 
treatment with the neither treatment, we see a little evidence that suggested donation levels 
(specifically the $4, $6, and $8 thresholds) gather greater frequencies of contributions than we 
might otherwise expect, also found by Croson and Marks (2001).  We also see that relatively low 
suggested gift amounts appear to be discouraging the maximum donation, which may indicate 
that prices are affecting norms; if one sees many low suggested contributions, one might think 
that she is not expected to give much.  Because we know from other researchers (including 
Croson, Handy, and Shang, 2009, and Croson and Shang, 2009) that norms can affect giving, the 
next experiment will better control for norms by providing price points that are evenly 
distributed across the $0-$20 range.  As we noted previously, the information that prices carry 
about the productivity of charitable dollars could cause giving to increase or decrease and, thus, 
we will continue to include this hypothesis among our group of potential contributors to the 
negative price effects.   
 Finally, we notice from the graphs that the distribution of contributions in the both 
treatment, while it shares some similarities to the distribution in the price treatment in that there 
is a lower frequency of contributions at the maximum, witnesses a lower frequency of 
contributions at the bottom of the distribution than in either of the distributions in the choice or 
price treatments.  Something about the interaction is making the distribution of contributions less 
skewed to the left, suggesting a shift in behavior when one can “shop” for a charitable gift that 
does not quite exist when one simply makes a charitable donation while choosing or seeing 
prices alone.  If people gain more utility from charitable gift-giving than from donating, then a 
catalogue might lead to greater contributions if the interaction term is large enough to overpower 
the two individual negative effects of choice and prices.  When we test for these effects on a 
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broader set of demographics, we find that such a case is possible, though we also find some 
interesting differences in behavior depending upon one‟s age.   
 
2.3  Experiment 2 
To facilitate comparison, the experiment was kept as similar to the previous experiment 
as possible with the exception of a clarified donation form and an even distribution of price 
points ($4, $8, $12, $16, $20), which partially controls for the potentially low norm that may 
have been established in the previous experiment.
8
  In order to attain the even distribution of 
prices, items from the Adventist Development and Relief Association (henceforth, ADRA) gift 
catalogue were utilized as well as items from the Samaritan’s Purse gift catalogue.9  The items 
were milk, a soccer ball, school supplies, clean water for a family, and hot lunches for a month.  
Subjects were told that items came from two different charities, but the names were not revealed 
until the end of the experiment.  Subjects were again given $20 to split between themselves and 
charity, and a 50% match of contributions was again utilized.  Because subjects could not 
physically watch a check being written, they were provided with a chance to request 
confirmation of the total amount given via e-mail through eLab (described below) to ensure 
anonymity.  Subjects were informed that their contact information would not be revealed.  73 
subjects requested confirmation.   
The online experiment was run on adults ranging in age from 21 to 74, ranging in income 
from under $5,000 to over $100,000, and in education from completing less than high school to 
holding post-graduate degrees.  Subjects were recruited via e-mail through eLab, an online panel 
                                                 
8
 Previously, in the neither treatment, the average of the implied price points was 10 = (20+0)/2, but in the price 
treatment, the average was (0+4+6+8+9+15+20)/7 = 8.86.  Now, with or without prices, there is an implied norm of 10 
= (0+4+8+12+16+20)/6 = (20+0)/2. 
9
 The Adventist Development and Relief Agency contained projects at the required price points and also guaranteed 
funding would be used where designated.  Additionally, its project descriptions and pictures were similar to those of 
Samaritan’s Purse, keeping the visual stimulus similar between this and the student experiment.   
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of survey and experiment participants maintained by Owen Graduate School of Management at 
Vanderbilt University.  The subject pool is grown over time via online postings and currently 
contains about 80,000 potential participants.  These potential subjects file tax information with 
the University, so duplicates are not a problem, and they provide many controls upon signing up 
(such as age and education), reducing the need for/length of post-experiment surveys.  132 
subjects signed on between October 5
th
 and 14
th
, 2009, to participate in the experiment and an 
additional 12 subjects signed on during the end of October, after the initial study completion 
date; they are included here along with the initial 132, with the intent to utilize all available data 
to the extent possible.  Subjects were randomly assigned to treatments.  Of the144 subjects, 129 
completed the experiment (90% of responders).  16 subjects were removed due to inconsistencies 
in their survey responses, leaving us with 113 observations with controls from the first 
experiment.
10,11
  Appendix C contains screenshots of the experiment and survey.  Summary 
statistics about the adult sample, as a whole and by treatment, appear in Table 5.   
                                                 
10
 Among the dropped subjects, some provided education levels or ages (through birth years) below that of their 
responses when signing up with eLab, calling into question the validity of the other controls they provided.  Other 
subjects incorrectly answered a question in the survey that indicated they were not paying attention.  Subjects were 
asked to estimate the giving of other subjects in the experiment, which could be at most $20.  Subjects entering 
amounts greater than $20 were either paying no attention or trying to confuse results, so they were removed from the 
dataset, though their inclusion or exclusion did little to affect results.   
11
 Though three of these subjects did not complete the very end of the survey, which included some questions asked 
out of curiosity, they still provided all the needed controls and consistency checks.  Results are similar if they are 
excluded.   
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2.4  Experiment 2 Results 
As noted in Table 5, average giving in this experiment was $13.53, rather high relative to 
the last experiment ($10.09).  Conditional on giving, this average increases to $14.99.  The 
All Neither Choice Price Both
Subjects 113 29 29 29 26
Gave in the Experiment 90.27% 89.66% 86.21% 86.21% 100.00%
Average conditional on giving $14.99 $14.38 $15.96 $15.28 $14.38
Unconditional average $13.53 $12.90 $13.76 $13.17 $14.38
Given to charity last year $1,631.74 $276.55 $3,003.00 $1,953.79 $1,254.62
Heard of Samaritan's Purse 16.81% 13.79% 17.24% 27.59% 7.69%
Donated to Samaritan's Purse 8.85% 10.34% 3.45% 13.79% 7.69%
Heard of ADRA 1.77% 0.00% 0.00% 3.45% 3.85%
Donated to ADRA 0.88% 0.00% 0.00% 3.45% 0.00%
Age 45 42 47 46 46
Male 50.44% 44.83% 65.52% 41.38% 50.00%
Single, never married 23.01% 34.48% 10.34% 17.24% 30.77%
Married 57.52% 37.93% 65.52% 65.52% 61.54%
Divorced/Separated 15.04% 20.69% 17.24% 13.79% 7.69%
Widowed 0.88% 0.00% 3.45% 0.00% 0.00%
Domestic Partner 3.54% 6.90% 3.45% 3.45% 0.00%
Income < $5,000 5.31% 6.90% 3.45% 3.45% 7.69%
$5,000-$9,999 2.65% 6.90% 3.45% 0.00% 0.00%
$10,000-$14,999 2.65% 0.00% 3.45% 3.45% 3.85%
$15,000-$24,999 7.08% 10.34% 3.45% 6.90% 7.69%
$25,000-$34,999 20.35% 20.69% 24.14% 20.69% 15.38%
$35,000-$49,999 21.24% 27.59% 13.79% 20.69% 23.08%
$50,000-$74,999 19.47% 13.79% 20.69% 20.69% 23.08%
$75,000-$99,000 8.85% 3.45% 13.79% 6.90% 11.54%
$100,000 + 12.39% 10.34% 13.79% 17.24% 7.69%
Less than High School 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
High School 10.62% 10.34% 13.79% 6.90% 11.54%
Some College 33.63% 34.48% 37.93% 34.48% 26.92%
College 32.74% 31.03% 31.03% 37.93% 30.77%
Some Graduate Studies 7.08% 3.45% 10.34% 3.45% 11.54%
Graduate Degree 15.93% 20.69% 6.90% 17.24% 19.23%
Democrat 30.09% 44.83% 17.24% 20.69% 38.46%
Republican 33.63% 27.59% 37.93% 48.28% 19.23%
Independent 30.97% 24.14% 37.93% 20.69% 42.31%
Other 5.31% 3.45% 6.90% 10.34% 0.00%
Asian 3.54% 3.45% 3.45% 0.00% 7.69%
Black 3.54% 3.45% 6.90% 3.45% 0.00%
Hispanic 0.88% 3.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
White 88.50% 89.66% 86.21% 96.55% 80.77%
Other 3.54% 0.00% 3.45% 0.00% 11.54%
Religious (1/week or more) 24.78% 20.69% 31.03% 20.69% 26.92%
Religious (1/month or more) 36.28% 27.59% 51.72% 34.48% 30.77%
Jewish 4.42% 10.34% 0.00% 3.45% 3.85%
Hindu 0.88% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.85%
Muslim 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Catholic 17.70% 13.79% 34.48% 13.79% 7.69%
Protestant 49.56% 51.72% 44.83% 58.62% 42.31%
No religion 18.58% 10.34% 13.79% 17.24% 34.62%
Other 8.85% 13.79% 6.90% 6.90% 7.69%
Table 5:  Subject Characteristics, Experiment 2
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fraction of subjects giving something was similar to that of the previous experiment at 90%, 
though the percent giving everything was much higher: 44% of subjects versus 25% in the 
previous experiment.  These results contradict the findings of Eckel and Grossman (2000) who 
compare contributions in dictator games between volunteers (participants who are recruited and 
therefore opt in) and pseudo-volunteers (classroom participants who fail to opt out).  They find 
pseudo-volunteers (classroom participants) to be more generous.  However, their volunteers are 
also students, and their volunteers get paid at the end of the session in cash.  Our volunteers (the 
online subjects) are not physically present and get paid a few weeks later by check.  Many of 
them cited this reason or something similar when describing why they gave (so much) – they 
didn‟t have the money in their wallets.  Classroom volunteers, on the other hand, though they 
didn‟t have the money in their wallets, could see the money pouch and knew that it contained 
cash.  Even though the online experiment appears to encourage higher levels of giving, 
comparing across treatments should still give an accurate indication of the sign of any noticed 
differences.   
If we examine the average given in each treatment in Table 6, we see weak evidence of 
the same story we found from the student sample.  The price treatment still results in relatively 
low giving, though the both treatment results in the highest here.  However, the averages are all 
very similar.  The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of people in each category.  We 
notice that donors who have the ability to choose and do so give more than donors who have the 
ability to choose but refrain, though differences between these donors within their respective 
treatments are not quite significant (one-tailed t-test p-values of 0.13 and 0.15 for the choice and 
both treatments, respectively).  Additionally, comparing donors who had the option to choose but 
didn‟t exercise it to those who did not have the option (comparing donors in neither to those not 
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choosing in choice and donors in price to those not choosing in both), we see that those with the 
option to choose give less, though not significantly so (one-tailed t-test p-values were 0.46 and 
0.14, respectively).  We also notice that there are some $0 contributions in the neither, choice, 
and price treatments bringing the averages down, but no $0‟s in the both treatment.  Figures 3 
and 4, which contain cumulative distribution functions and probability density functions, 
respectively, highlight this difference, though it appears to be the only main difference between 
treatments.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  CDF‟s of Contribution Amounts by Treatment (Experiment 2) 
Neither  treatment (29) $12.89 Price  treatment (29) $13.17
     Donors (26) $14.38      Donors (25) $15.28
Choice  treatment (29) $13.76 Both  treatment (26) $14.38
     Donors (25) $15.96      Donors (26) $14.38
          Choosing (17) $16.82           Choosing (19) $15.21
          Not choosing (8) $14.13           Not choosing (7) $12.14
Table 6:  Average Giving by Treatment, Experiment 2
***, **, and * denote significant differences from the neither treatment at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed t-tests).  Carats are used similarly to 
denote differences conditional on giving.  The number of subjects in each 
group is in parentheses.  
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Figure 4:  PDF‟s of Contribution Amounts by Treatment (Experiment 2) 
 
As the above summary data would suggest, initial regression output indicated no 
significant effects from choice, from prices, or from their interaction.  However, as discussed in 
the introduction, we have reason to believe that some of these effects might differ by age group.  
Thus, when we split the data by age, and interact an age indicator with treatment indicators, 
interesting results ensue.  First, splitting by age and looking at averages (in Table 7) and densities 
(in Figures 5 and 6) we find that among the younger group, the highest average giving is in the 
both treatment and the lowest in the price treatment.  The opposite appears for the older group.  
We again see that giving by those who chose is higher than giving by those who didn‟t choose 
within a particular treatment in all four cases, though significance is not attained (one-tailed t-test 
p-values of 0.19 and 0.23 for the young in the choice and both treatments, respectively, and 0.35 
and 0.26 for the older).  Additionally, giving by those who didn‟t choose but had the option to is 
lower than giving by those who didn‟t choose and didn‟t have the option to in three of four cases 
(for each age group, comparing donors who refrained from choosing in choice to donors in 
neither and comparing donors who refrained from choosing in both to donors in price), but with 
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little significance (one-tailed t-test p-values were 0.41 and 0.35 for the respective groups among 
the younger and 0.47 and 0.04 among the older).   
 
 
 
Looking at Figure 5, we can see how, among the younger half of the sample, the choice 
and price treatments resulted in lower donations, especially in the price treatment, by accruing 
many donations at $0 and many fewer donations at $20.  Among the older half of the sample, the 
opposite results appear in Figure 6, allowing us to start to identify unlikely theories of behavior.  
Choice overload and the avoidance of regret, for example, are each difficult to support now that 
we see a positive effect on giving and, in specific, a positive effect on giving (and only one 
person refraining) among the older, the group that is more prone to overload (Besedes, Deck, 
Sarangi, and Shor, 2008).  The relatively low norms that our prices may have induced (as most of 
them were below the endowment) would suggest a possible negative effect from seeing prices 
for all groups, though we see a positive effect on donations from the older, calling into question 
the possibility that prices established low norms.  We also notice in Figure 5 that the frequency 
of the maximum contribution is quite high among the young in the both treatment but relatively 
low among the older, consistent with a theory of a distinction between cash donations and 
Neither  treatment (18) $11.89 Price  treatment (11) 7.09* Neither  treatment (11) $14.55 Price  treatment (18) $16.89
     Donors (16) $13.38      Donors (8) $9.75      Donors (10) $16.00      Donors (17) $17.88
Choice  treatment (11) $10.45 Both  treatment (13) $14.54 Choice  treatment (18) $15.78 Both  treatment (13) $14.23
     Donors (8) $14.38      Donors (13) $14.54      Donors (17) $16.71      Donors (13) $14.23
          Choosing (4) $16.25           Choosing (10) $15.40           Choosing (13) $17.00           Choosing (9) $15.00
          Not choosing (4) $12.50           Not choosing (3) $11.67           Not choosing (4) $15.75           Not choosing (4) $12.50
Younber than 45 (53)     $11.25
Table 7:  Average Giving by Treatment, Experiment 2
45 and Older (60)     $15.55
***, **, and * denote significant differences from the neither treatment at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed t-tests).  Carats are used similarly to denote differences 
conditional on giving.  The number of subjects in each group is in parentheses.  
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charitable gifts, as the older and the younger display different preferences for or adhere to 
different norms for giving cash and giving gifts, at least to family.  Because differences appear in 
the experiments, we can postulate that preferences are driving norms rather than the other way 
around for, if social norms were driving preferences, we might not see differences in behavior 
between the older and the younger since the experiment abstracted from any social setting.   
 
 
Figure 5:  PDF‟s of Contribution Amounts (Younger than 45) by Treatment 
 
 
Figure 6:  PDF‟s of Contribution Amounts (45 and Older) by Treatment 
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Table 8 reports the results of nonparametric equality of distribution tests, highlighting 
some differences between contributions in the neither treatment and the price treatment, and 
between those in the price treatment and the both treatment among the young, as well as between 
contributions by the older and the younger for each of the price and choice treatments.  Figure 7 
provides a graphical interpretation of these results.  We notice that for the younger half of the 
sample, the distribution of contributions in the both treatment stochastically dominates the 
distributions in any other treatment, and the distribution of contributions in the price treatment is 
dominated by the distributions in all other treatments.  We also see that the distributions of 
contributions from the older half of the sample dominate the distributions from the younger half 
with the exception of the distribution of contributions by the younger in the both treatment.  
Additionally, stark differences appear between donations of the older and the younger in the 
choice treatment and again between them in the price treatment.   
 
 
 
0.647 0.094 0.204 0.472 0.199 0.880 WMW
0.974 0.213 0.276 0.848 0.377 1.000 KS
0.405 0.160 0.606 0.353 WMW
0.833 0.374 0.840 0.740 KS
0.012 0.136 WMW
0.048 0.465 KS
0.309 0.055 0.001 0.68 WMW
0.725 0.173 0.009 0.697 KS
Choice Price Both Choice
Neither
Choice
Price
Table 8:  Distribution Tests
Younger than 45 45 and Older
Cross-age Comparisons
Price Both
p-values reported from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests.  
Neither Choice Price Both
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Figure 7:  CDF‟s of Contribution Amounts by Treatment (Experiment 2, Split by Age) 
 
Demand for giving is estimated as before, though we will slice the data by age to see a 
more descriptive picture of the behavior induced by the components of charitable gift catalogues.  
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Binary controls were included to account for gender, income, education, religiousity (defined as 
before), political affiliation, marital status, ethnicity, and broad categories of religious affiliation 
(Protestant and Catholic).  Age was controlled for as well.  Self-reported giving to charitable 
organizations in the previous year was also included, as was an indicator for subjects who had 
previously donated to either charity (9.7% of the sample; results are marginally weakened by its 
inclusion).   
Income data are categorical with a median category containing income in the range of 
$35,000-$49,000.  The 24 individuals in this category were included in the low income group 
when creating a binary income variable, resulting in a 59/41 split.  Such a split seems reasonable 
given the median household income of $52,175 reported by the U.S. Census Bureau‟s 2006-2008 
American Community Survey.  Similarly, education was also categorical with a median category 
of “college.”  The 37 individuals in this category were included in the high education group 
when creating a binary education variable, resulting in a 44/56 split.  The median age of the 
sample was 46, though we will use 45 as the dividing line for ease of comparison with the next 
chapter (when combining all of the data from this and the next chapter, the median age is 45); 
ideally, we would like to compare those in their twenties to the students, but the sample size is 
not large enough.
12
   
Table 9 reports results from “splitting” the sample by age and interacting indicators for 
each respective half with treatment indicators (specifications (1)-(3)).
13,14
  To make clear any 
                                                 
12
 Reducing the cutoff age of the dividing line somewhat is possible.  For example, using an indicator separating by 
age 40 still yields 46 observations among the young.  Results are similar to those reported here, with a little more 
significance on the coefficients of interest (the choice-price interactions) for the young and a little less for the older.  
Increasing the cutoff age to 46 yields similar regression coefficients, though one level of significance is lost on the 
coefficients of interest for the young and some of the coefficients of interest for the older.  As we will see, opposite 
effects are found for the two age groups, with the young behaving similarly to the students.  Thus, it is not surprising 
that increasing the dividing line weakens results slightly.   
13
 Though “splitting” as detailed above does include some implicit assumptions that controls affect giving in the same 
way, regardless of age group, results are similar if we split the sample entirely.   
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interaction between choice and prices, in the last three columns, instead of treatment indicators, 
we interact the age indicator with indicators for choice, prices, and their interaction.  Though any 
given treatment does not result in statistically different contributions than the baseline neither 
treatment, when we account for the fact that choice is present in the choice and both treatments 
and prices are present in the price and both treatments, we can see a significant interaction effect 
for each of the two age groups.  For the young, the interaction effect is positive and significant, 
as it was among the student sample.  For the older, it is negative and significant, explaining the 
lack of significance appearing without a split.  Specifications (3) and (6) report coefficient 
estimates conditional on giving.  Both interaction effects weaken, indicating that part of these 
effects are derived from changes on the extensive margin.  Controls do not appear to be quite as 
important to giving among this sample as they were among the student sample, though marital 
status, political affiliation, and religious affiliation have statistically significant effects on 
giving.
15
   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
14
 Age and age-squared are included along with the young-old indicator as we have evidence that the relationship 
between age and giving is quadratic (Clotfelter, 2002).   
15
 Results are similar when varied groups, or all of the controls, are dropped, though we lose significance of the 
choice-price interaction among the older and gain some significance of other treatment indicators when very few 
controls are included.   
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3  Discussion 
After observing the expansion of the Samaritan’s Purse gift catalogue from 10 to 40 
items over the course of a few years, and after noting the appearance of gift catalogues on the 
Dependent Variable:  
Tobit Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y*choice treatment -5.006 -2.218 -0.281 Y*choice -5.006 -2.218 -0.281
(4.272)         (2.647)         (2.484)         (4.272)         (2.647)         (2.484)         
Y*price treatment -6.194 -4.103 -3.394 Y*price -6.194 -4.103 -3.394
(4.700)         (3.071)         (3.102)         (4.700)         (3.071)         (3.102)         
Y*both treatment 6.074 2.065 0.423 Y*choice*price 17.27** 8.386* 4.098
(5.193)         (2.888)         (2.716)         (8.219)         (4.696)         (4.391)         
Younger than 45 5.173 1.181 -1.100 5.173 1.181 -1.100
(7.111)         (4.052)         (3.270)         (7.111)         (4.052)         (3.270)         
O*choice treatment 5.409 2.049 0.871 O*choice 5.409 2.049 0.871
(5.551)         (2.616)         (1.792)         (5.551)         (2.616)         (1.792)         
O*price treatment 9.513* 3.598 2.188 O*price 9.513* 3.598 2.188
(5.446)         (2.704)         (1.853)         (5.446)         (2.704)         (1.853)         
O*both treatment -4.958 -1.863 -2.652 O*choice*price -19.88*** -7.509** -5.711*
(4.792)         (2.535)         (2.184)         (7.399)         (3.651)         (2.910)         
Age -0.289 -0.152 -0.223 -0.289 -0.152 -0.223
(0.722)         (0.424)         (0.396)         (0.722)         (0.424)         (0.396)         
Age squared 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.004
(0.007)         (0.004)         (0.003)         (0.007)         (0.004)         (0.003)         
High income 3.749 1.164 0.775 3.749 1.164 0.775
(3.188)         (1.653)         (1.526)         (3.188)         (1.653)         (1.526)         
Male -2.791 -0.863 -1.198 -2.791 -0.863 -1.198
(2.873)         (1.639)         (1.619)         (2.873)         (1.639)         (1.619)         
Married -7.658** -3.234* -3.637** -7.658** -3.234* -3.637**
(3.796)         (1.875)         (1.644)         (3.796)         (1.875)         (1.644)         
Single 1.073 0.392 -0.267 1.073 0.392 -0.267
(3.937)         (2.154)         (1.902)         (3.937)         (2.154)         (1.902)         
High education -1.984 -1.034 -0.745 -1.984 -1.034 -0.745
(2.649)         (1.396)         (1.249)         (2.649)         (1.396)         (1.249)         
Religious 5.028 2.112 3.521** 5.028 2.112 3.521**
(3.542)         (1.899)         (1.586)         (3.542)         (1.899)         (1.586)         
Democrat -10.02*** -3.841** -2.967* -10.02*** -3.841** -2.967*
(3.194)         (1.614)         (1.628)         (3.194)         (1.614)         (1.628)         
Republican -11.18*** -4.800*** -2.315 -11.18*** -4.800*** -2.315
(3.378)         (1.629)         (1.437)         (3.378)         (1.629)         (1.437)         
White -5.108 -1.490 -0.350 -5.108 -1.490 -0.350
(3.415)         (1.772)         (1.743)         (3.415)         (1.772)         (1.743)         
Donated before -1.281 0.281 -2.004 -1.281 0.281 -2.004
(4.469)         (2.107)         (1.903)         (4.469)         (2.107)         (1.903)         
Charitable contributions 0.000 0.000 0.000176* 0.000 0.000 0.000176*
(0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         
Catholic -7.847* -2.896 -2.698 -7.847* -2.896 -2.698
(4.629)         (2.485)         (2.387)         (4.629)         (2.485)         (2.387)         
Protestant -6.566** -2.818* -3.790*** -6.566** -2.818* -3.790***
(3.264)         (1.639)         (1.381)         (3.264)         (1.639)         (1.381)         
Constant 26.75 18.94 23.87** 26.75 18.94 23.87**
(21.48)         (12.82)         (11.80)         (21.48)         (12.82)         (11.80)         
Pseudo/R-squared 0.10 0.34 0.32 0.10 0.34 0.32
Prob > F 0.0020 0.0000 0.0005 0.0020 0.0000 0.0005
Observations 113 113 102 113 113 102
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
11 left-censored, 52 uncensored, 50 right-censored.
OLS OLS
Table 9:  Regression Results, Unconditional and Conditional on Giving
Amount Given
34 
 
websites of many other nonprofits (Alternative Gifts International, World Vision, and Amazima, 
to name a few), it seems natural to assume that this strategy results in an increase in 
contributions.  The evidence provided in this paper suggests that it may, though the effect of a 
catalogue on contributions depends upon the combined effects of its components.  For the young, 
in both the student and online samples the isolated effects of choice and prices are each negative, 
and the interaction between the two is positive (and significant in both experiments), but the 
combined effect of the three depends upon the sample.  Among the students the combined effect 
is negative and significant.  Among the younger half of the online sample the combined effect is 
positive and insignificant.  Among the older half of the online sample the isolated effects of 
choice and prices are each positive, and the interaction between the two is negative (and 
significant), for a combined negative but insignificant effect of the three.  Regardless of overall 
effects of a catalogue found here, it appears that there exists some combination of choice and 
prices that lead to a positive combined effect: since the interaction effect has the opposite sign of 
the individual effects, it should be possible to design a catalogue that results in more giving if the 
positive effect(s) outweigh the negative effect(s), though it also appears that this design will 
differ for different age groups.   
The moral of the story, then, from a nonprofit‟s point of view is that prices but not choice 
should be provided for older donors and either both or neither should be provided for younger 
donors, depending upon the nonprofit‟s confidence about the combined effect as well as the cost 
to recipients of potentially binding constraints (from allowing donors to designate).  That is, even 
if more would be contributed through a catalogue, recipients might not necessarily be better off if 
the items donors choose to contribute to are not the items the recipients themselves need.  
However, if a large enough proportion of contributions are left undesignated, then designations 
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will have no effect.  It is interesting to note that organizations such as Heifer International and 
Oxfam America operate in an environment analogous to the price treatments – donors know 
prices, but they cannot choose the allocation of their donations.  (Technically, they can engage in 
the act of choosing but donations are not allocated according to donor choices, which is clearly 
stated.)  Based on the results of the experiments examined, such a strategy would seem to be the 
best choice if the majority of donors are in their late-forties or older but the worst choice if the 
reverse is true.   
The moral of the story from an economist‟s point of view?  A fundamental shift occurs 
when charitable donations become charitable gift purchases through the interaction between 
choice and prices, an interaction that we found to be significant, though differing in sign by age.  
For the young, the skeptical reader could argue that choice alone is a nuisance and prices alone 
are not meaningful, but choice and prices are complementary, providing a significant positive 
interaction.  However, the same argument would not work for the older.  Choice is meaningful, 
prices are meaningful, but together they cease to be?  The significant interaction effects we found 
suggest that by combining choice and prices, charities successfully alter perceptions of the 
transaction from a charitable donation to a charitable gift purchase, and that the two are not 
mentally coded in the same fashion.  We have seen evidence that donations and gift purchases 
enter the utility function separately, and they may even be drawn from different budgetary 
accounts.  In any case, we need an additional dimension in our analysis of charitable 
contributions since a gift is not mentally equivalent to a donation.   
To account for this additional dimension, we could suppose that utility is a function of 
private consumption, one‟s charitable donations, and one‟s charitable gifts, where dollars 
donated cannot be added directly to dollars spent on gifts.  A simple utility function could look 
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something like the following:  𝑈 𝑥, 𝑑, 𝑔 = 𝑢 𝑥 +  𝑣 𝑑 +  𝑧(𝑔), where 𝑥 represents private 
consumption, 𝑑 dollars spent on charitable donations, and 𝑔 dollars spent on charitable gifts, 
their sum equaling the endowment.  Contributions from others are ignored for ease, and choice 
and prices are assumed to be held constant.
16
  We know that they, too, may have some effects on 
behavior, but we want to focus on the effect of their interaction.  The functions 𝑣(. ) and 𝑧(. ) 
could be transforming contributions into “warm glow,” appearing in some form or another as 
early as Becker (1974) and formalized by Andreoni (1989, 1990), or into charitable output 
(combining intuition from the traditional public goods models (for example, Bergstrom, Blume, 
and Varian, 1986) with intuition from Duncan (2004), that a person cares about production 
resulting from her contributions), etc., or some amalgam.  For our purposes it does not really 
matter so long as 𝑣(. ) ≠ 𝑧(. ) when holding constant prices and choice.  That is, when the effects 
of prices and choice are fixed, if the two functions are the same, glow or charitable output will 
not change with a shift from charitable donation to charitable gift purchase, but we have seen 
evidence that the contributor‟s utility does change with such a shift.  Thus, 𝑣(. ) ≠ 𝑧(. ) when 
holding constant prices and choice.   
Utility is additively separable, allowing for the many corner solutions witnessed in the 
experiments, and similar to others in the literature (for example, DellaVigna, List, and 
Malmendier, 2009).  Let 𝑢’ > 0, 𝑣’ > 0, 𝑧’ > 0, 𝑢’’ < 0, 𝑣’’ < 0, 𝑧’’ < 0, 𝑢(0) = 𝑣(0) =
𝑔(0) = 0, then beginning at a corner solution of no giving, dollars to charity may increase when 
charitable donations begin to feel more like purchases of charitable gifts so long as the utility 
from charitable gift-giving exceeds the utility from donating in the traditional manner; if the 
                                                 
16
 Technically, we are holding constant not only the suggested gift amounts but also whether or not they appear, as 
“prices” here are capturing the informational component of suggested gift amounts.  A change in prices, here, would 
mean that the suggested gift amounts are included or excluded.  Charities cannot truthfully alter any specific good’s 
price in order to increase contributions because the prices, or suggested gift amounts, provide contribution levels that 
cover costs of provision.  We assume charities truthfully report these costs.   
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inequality is reversed, we would continue to see no donations.  Beginning at an interior, dollars 
to charity will increase when charitable donations begin to feel more like purchases of charitable 
gifts if the marginal utility of gift-giving exceeds the marginal utility of donating; if the 
inequality is reversed, contributions would decrease.  Beginning at a corner solution of no private 
consumption, dollars to charity will remain at the entire endowment if the utility from gift-giving 
exceeds the utility from donating; if the reverse inequality holds, contributions may decrease.  
Thus, if the interaction between choice and prices transforms a donation into a gift purchase, we 
would expect to see some changes in the amounts given, and we did.  Interestingly, these 
changes differed by age group, suggesting that traditional gift-giving norms affect glow from 
giving or, alternatively, differences in utility from giving cash versus in-kind gifts may be 
driving norms.  Since it is more likely that we would see differences in behavior in an abstract 
setting if preferences are driving norms rather than the reverse, we will assume this is the case, 
though acknowledge that the reverse causality may be possible.  If we suppose that older people 
have had more time and experience to help them to realize that their preferences are not 
representative, they may derive more utility from giving cash than giving gifts, yielding the norm 
that we see and the results in the experiment.   
Though the distinction between charitable gift and charitable donation may occur only in 
one‟s objective function, casual observation and conversation indicate that charitable gift 
purchases and charitable donations may be drawn from different budget accounts.  If charitable 
gift purchases are mentally coded as something other than traditional charitable donations, it is 
plausible to suppose that they may be taken out of a private account rather than a traditional 
charity account, especially if they are purchased at the store while shopping for private 
consumption goods.  In the experiments examined here, subjects were endowed with $20, a 
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small windfall that could have been added to any account (or given its own), lessening any 
potential effects from binding constraints.  Thus, even if charitable gifts and charitable donations 
come out of different accounts, by providing money to subjects to begin with, differences in 
behavior due to mental accounting are likely to be less pronounced than if subjects were not 
endowed.  If the same experiment was conducted without providing the windfall, mental 
constraints would be more likely to bind.  Comparing behavior of those with an endowment and 
those without could yield insights about the existence of mental accounting effects on 
contributions.  In any case, the significant interaction between choice and prices, an interaction 
that provides donors with a gift purchase experience, suggests a fundamental shift in mental 
coding, either in utility “accounts” alone or also in budget accounts, but a shift nonetheless.  
Now that we know it exists, it will be an interesting challenge to determine its exact whereabouts 
and to see when and how the interaction can lead to enhanced giving.   
The moral of the story for the academic is that there is much work left to be done, though 
the study allows us to rule out some unlikely contributors to behavior.  With respect to choice, 
Duncan‟s (2004) model of impact philanthropy appears to be most consistent with findings, as it 
allows for negative or positive effects from choice since in it choice alters donors‟ perceived 
impacts.  The opposite effects by age group could be accounted for by a plausible assumption 
that perceptions of impact may change as one ages, gaining experience as a donor and 
information about charitable outcomes.   
Though we find some negative effects from choice, as mentioned previously, Siegel 
(2006) finds no effect of choice on charitable contributions in a field experiment soliciting 
donations for a Dutch nonprofit.  However, only two broad categories were provided to choose 
from and she notes that the option to choose may have been unnoticed on the donation form.  
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Though Siegel finds no effect from offering donors choice, Null (2008) notes that when subjects 
are asked to divide a fixed donation between “their” charity (a club or group of which they are a 
member) and another charity which offers a choice between two items, subjects substitute away 
from their charity to the one offering choice.  However, her experiment utilized a within-subjects 
design, which may have encouraged subjects to change behavior when parameters were altered.  
Additionally, the total amount donated to both charities was held fixed by design.  The fact that 
subjects substituted towards the charity offering choice, however, may provide some intuition 
behind the increasing appearance of gift catalogues.  Even if the overall effect on contributions is 
insignificant or even negative, holding donors constant, providing a charitable gift catalogue may 
be less harmful than losing donors to other charities.  The negative effects from choice found in 
the between-subjects experiments presented here appear to stem in part from people who refrain 
from giving entirely.  Those who do choose, however, tend to give (insignificantly) more, 
consistent with Null‟s findings of a positive effect from choice.   
Finally, we should note that the negative effects we witnessed were among a young 
sample.  Seigel‟s sample spanned the age range of donors to the Dutch nonprofit she worked 
with, presumably a broad range of ages, which might help explain the lack of results as we 
noticed here opposite (though insignificant) effects of choice on contributions of the younger and 
the older halves of the online sample.  Null conducted experiments among members of Kiwanis, 
Lions, and Rotary clubs.  Though not necessarily older, it is probable that her subjects are 
relatively older, which might help to explain the positive effect of choice that she found.   
 Finally, we might wonder why we saw negative price effects for some groups but 
positive for others when any implied norm or implied efficiency of the charity should be the 
same for either group.  To try to gain understanding about the differing behavior, an out-of-
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sample survey of students and a post-experiment survey of the online sample asked subjects to 
estimate prices of the projects/goods described in the experiments to ascertain whether or not 
prices were lower or higher than expected.  One clear conclusion can be drawn from these survey 
responses: subjects had no idea what charitable goods cost.  Standard deviations were often the 
size of mean estimates and sometimes much larger, though the median estimates were not 
terribly far from actual prices in most cases.  The reason why these prices produced opposite 
effects is puzzling, though we will posit that the information they contain about 
efficiency/productivity could still be driving the opposing effects, even though both groups 
provided roughly similar price estimates.  Recall that prices that are lower or higher than 
expected can affect contributions in either direction.  Thus, opposite effects can be witnessed.  
We could confirm our theory by “changing” prices across treatments and looking for opposite 
effects in behavior of the older and younger subjects.
17
  Though we cannot deceive subjects 
about the costs of goods to nonprofits, there do exist some homogeneous goods provided by 
multiple nonprofits but at different prices (mosquito nets, for example).  If “raising” and 
“lowering” their prices lead to opposite behavior among the older and younger, we could argue 
that prices are affecting contributions through the information they provide about the efficiency 
of the charity (or the purchasing power of charitable dollars), causing some subjects to give more 
when charitable dollars are very productive and some subjects to give less.   
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
If young people give more when they can shop for a charitable gift than we would expect 
them to give based on the separate effects of choice or of prices alone, then we can argue that a 
                                                 
17
 We already know that changing effective prices (through matching donations) can affect behavior (see Eckel and 
Grossman, 2003, and Karlan and List, 2007, for example), but this would let us know if changing the informational 
component of prices (what they imply about the productivity of charitable dollars) can affect behavior.   
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catalogue creates the potential to turn a donation into a gift purchase in the mental coding of 
contributors.  In fact, in some cases, a good actually arrives on your doorstep.  The Samaritan’s 
Purse gift catalogue is one of a few that contain the option of contributing in honor of a friend or 
family member in place of a birthday or Christmas gift, for example.  I can choose to give a goat 
to a family in Honduras in honor of my brother instead of buying him a gift directly, and he will 
receive a card from the charity, describing “his” gift.  While an interesting alternative to a 
traditional gift, how is such a transaction coded?  In utility?  In one‟s budget?  What are the 
effects on total contributions?  If transforming a charitable donation into a charitable gift can 
produce an increase in contributions, what will be the effect seen if a charitable gift is 
transformed into a substitute for a traditional gift or an addition to it?  The next chapter begins to 
address these questions.   
Another interesting strategy that might be tapping into the different mental perceptions of 
donations and gifts is a method utilized by World Vision.  The nonprofit offers gifts to donors 
who contribute to their “Maximum Impact Fund,” gifts such as stuffed animals or bracelets 
which may be kept for oneself or given away as presents.  If I send money to World Vision and 
receive a present for myself or for a friend or family member, is that present considered private 
consumption, traditional gift, or charitable donation?  How will that mental coding affect the 
total amount contributed?  If transforming a charitable donation into a charitable gift purchase 
can affect contributions, might we also see a change in behavior when a charitable donation is 
combined with a traditional gift?  These questions will be addressed in future work.   
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Appendix A:  Pilot Experiments 
Early pilots provided some intuition about donor behavior by revealing interesting 
distributional differences, as evidenced in Table A.1 below, motivating further study.   
 
 
 
The pilots followed a dictator game design utilized by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) 
and modified by Eckel and Grossman (2000, 2003, 2006).  Subjects completed 12 allocation 
problems with varying endowments and contribution match rates.  One of the 12 problems was 
randomly chosen to be enacted, and subjects and the charity were paid based on that problem.  
Payment envelopes and code numbers were utilized to ensure anonymity.  As in Eckel and 
Grossman (2000, 2003, 2006), donations accrued to charity, though subjects did not have a 
choice among charities to avoid confounding effects between choice of charity and choice of 
project.  All donations accrued to Samaritan’s Purse.   
The first pilot was run on 47 students during class time in an introductory economics 
course at Kennesaw State University in Georgia.  It contained two treatments, choice and neither 
(Komogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-values of 0.01 and 0.06).  In both 
treatments, pictures and project descriptions were presented to subjects in a fashion meant to 
0.061 0.562 0.141 WMW
0.160 0.029 0.114 KS
0.043 0.814 WMW
0.001 0.809 KS
0.087 WMW
0.029 KS
Table A.1:  Distribution Tests
Choice Price Both
Neither
Choice
Price
p-values reported from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
(WMW) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests.  
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mimic a catalogue of five items.  Endowment levels were set at $8, $10, and $12, and matching 
rates at 0, 25, 50, and 100% for 3x4=12 problems per subject.  In the treatment neither, the 
subject divided her endowment in each problem between herself and the charity’s “area of most 
need.”  In the choice treatment, again the subject divided her endowment in each problem 
between herself and the charity, but she could designate donations to one or more of the five 
projects listed as well as to the area of most need.   
The second pilot was run at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs in 3 
classroom sessions (introductory accounting, economics, and sociology), also during class time, 
with 75 subjects total.  This experiment contained four treatments (neither, choice, price, and 
both, though project prices exceeded endowments in some decisions, so the both treatment did 
not capture a complete effect of combining choice and prices).  Again, in all treatments, pictures 
and project descriptions were presented, similar to providing a catalogue (also, with five items).  
Subjects in the choice and both treatments could designate donations to one or more specific 
projects (or the area of most need).  Subjects in the price and both treatments saw one additional 
line in each project description providing the price; these subjects also saw the price in a separate 
line, though it was framed as a “suggested gift amount,” the framing that charities use.  The same 
match rates were used as were utilized in the first pilot, but endowments were set to $25, $50, 
and $75, although only 20% of subjects were paid beyond a $5 show-up fee.  (One out of every 
five payment envelopes was randomly drawn from a box.)  The projects used for this experiment 
differed from the previous experiment to ensure a broad range of price points ($6, $15, $25, $45, 
$60), a strategy that appears to be employed by nonprofits.   
Although we saw distributional differences in many of the pair-wise treatment 
comparisons, the experiments were redesigned for the following reasons:  (1) when every subject 
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is making 12 choices about how much to give, it is difficult to determine effects from a choice of 
what to give, (2) when subjects in the price and both treatments can afford every project in some 
of the 12 allocation problems but not in others, changes in behavior may be elicited that would 
not otherwise occur, (3) when some projects are affordable and some are not, it is difficult to 
capture a true interaction between choice and prices, the focus of this paper, and (4) the 12-
problem design resulted in some charitable gambling – a sizable proportion of subjects created 
lotteries for themselves in which the payoff was high (low) in most of the 12 problems and low 
(high) in one or two, rendering giving behavior difficult to interpret.  Therefore, the experiments 
were redesigned so that each subject made one decision and all subjects faced the same 
endowment in that decision.  Additionally, the charitable gambling witnessed in the pilot 
experiments prompted the research of Chapter 3, which addresses the effects of payment salience 
on risk aversion.   
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Appendix B:  Experiment 1 Documents 
The design of these documents benefited greatly from Eckel and Grossman (2003).   
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Appendix C:  Experiment 2 Screens 
Screen 1 asked subjects about internet capabilities (dial-up, high-speed, etc.) for the 
benefit of eLab.   
 
Screen 2, All treatments 
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Screen 3, part 1, Neither and Choice treatments 
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Screen 3, part 1, Price and Both treatments 
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Screen 3, part 2, Neither and Price treatments 
 
 
Screen 3, part 2, Choice and Both treatments 
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The following survey screens appeared in all treatments.  In the Price and Both 
treatments, Question (6) read: If you had not been told, what would you have thought it cost to 
provide the goods described previously (they appear in no particular order):   
 
Survey Screens, All treatments 
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Conclusion Screen, All treatments 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ONE-STOP SHOPPING?  CHARITABLE GIVING THROUGH GIFT CATALOGUES 
 
1  Introduction 
When we think of charitable giving, we usually think of dollar donations to a charity, and 
when we think of gifts for friends and family, we often conjure up images of presents bought at 
Macy’s or Target.  However, during the past few Christmas seasons I have received, along with 
the traditional holiday catalogues from Eddie Bauer and Crate and Barrel, charitable gift 
catalogues from Samaritan’s Purse and World Vision – catalogues offering charitable substitutes 
for traditional Christmas gifts.  Instead of a shirt for my brother, I can buy a coat for a little girl 
in Eastern Europe, and give it to her in his honor.  Instead of a necklace for my sister, I can buy a 
pair of ducks for a family in South America, and present my sister with a card from the charity, 
telling her of the contribution.  When nonprofits offer a catalogue of charitable goods, I may be 
able to complete my Christmas shopping and my charitable giving all in one place.  When my 
brother has everything he needs and many things he wants, why not spend my Christmas budget 
on somebody who has very little of both?  This is the message sent by many charities now 
providing alternatives to traditional gifts.   
In the previous chapter, we found the need for a distinction in our coding of charitable 
contributions to account for differing outcomes when those contributions take the form of a gift 
rather than a donation.  In this chapter, we will look for an additional effect that may appear 
when other-regarding behavior yields a gift that is both a charitable gift and a substitute for a 
traditional gift.  If giving has the potential to increase when charitable donations become 
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charitable gift purchases, as Chapter 1 suggests, how much more might the increase in giving be 
when a charitable gift purchase can substitute for a traditional gift purchase (or add to it)?  In this 
paper we will examine a first attempt at answering this question.   
Instead of substitutes for Christmas gifts, we will look at potential substitutes for 
Valentine gifts, and we will do so by utilizing laboratory experiments.  In the experiments we 
will differentiate among (1) donating in the traditional fashion, (2) purchasing a charitable gift 
for an unknown recipient through a charitable gift catalogue, and (3) purchasing a charitable gift 
as a substitute for a traditional gift, through a charitable gift catalogue with the option to 
purchase in honor of somebody special for Valentine’s Day.  In this manner, we will begin to see 
the effects from transforming a charitable contribution into a substitute for a traditional gift by 
dissecting the strategy into its component parts: transforming a charitable donation into a 
charitable gift, and transforming a charitable gift into a substitute for a traditional gift.  If such a 
contribution is mentally coded only as a charitable gift, we should see no difference in behavior 
when substitutability is introduced.  If substitutability alters the coding to that of traditional gift, 
we may see some differences in behavior if utility from traditional gift purchases differs from 
utility from charitable gift purchases (and if budgets for each type of gift also differ, as one could 
imagine possible when we have evidence of the quirky way that people often account for 
transactions (Thaler, 1985 and 1999)).  Finally, if a good that is both charitable gift and 
traditional gift, wrapped up in one package, is mentally considered a two-for-one deal, we should 
see some effects of “double counting.”   
Though we will not be able to differentiate between the last two possibilities, we will find 
that at least one of them appears to be present when we examine the experiment results in section 
3.  That is, we find a change in behavior when subjects can substitute a charitable gift for a 
68 
 
traditional gift, up and above the change in behavior that occurs when a charitable donation 
becomes a charitable gift, the change addressed in the previous chapter.  More specifically, we 
find that the added effect of allowing subjects to contribute in honor of somebody special for 
Valentine’s Day is positive and significant for the younger half of the sample and negative and 
significant for the older half of the sample.  In section 4 we will discuss some potential reasons 
for these findings.  For now, we turn to the details of the experiment design.   
 
2  Experiment Design 
The experiment consisted of a dictator game, in which each subject made one decision, 
determining how to allocate $20 between herself and charity after reading instructions and 
information about five charitable goods/projects.  All subject decisions were carried out.  
Subjects’ contributions accrued to actual charities, as they did in the previous chapter and in 
Eckel and Grossman (2000, 2003, 2006) and Eckel, Grossman, and Milano (2007).  Because 
subjects could not physically watch a check being written, they were told they would be provided 
with confirmation via e-mailed copies of receipts (through eLab (described later), to maintain 
anonymity).  Subjects were randomly assigned to three treatments:  neither, both, and valentine, 
where “neither” and “both” are relics of the previous chapter.  “Neither” refers to the control or 
baseline but was labeled thus to avoid confusion in the previous chapter between “control” and 
“donor control,” and “both” refers to the fact that both choice and prices (suggested gift 
amounts) were presented to subjects, two gift catalogue components that we have reason to 
believe may affect the levels and rates of contributions, as noted in the previous chapter.   
Prior literature also suggests and sometimes finds differences in behavior in a variety of 
other environments when donor control (choice) or suggested, explicitly or implicitly, 
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contributions are presented to subjects (Seigel, 2006, and Null, 2008, for the former; Croson and 
Marks, 2001, Croson and Shang, 2009, Croson, Handy, and Shang, 2009, to name a few related 
to the latter).  The treatments maintain a labeling that will facilitate comparisons between this 
and the previous chapter, in which we found that the interaction between choice and prices alters 
behavior in such a way that suggests a mental differentiation between a charitable donation 
(which occurs when choice and prices are not present together) and a charitable gift purchase 
(which occurs when both choice and prices are present).  The both treatment is included to 
control for the charitable gift purchase component of the valentine treatment, as we want to know 
if there is any additional effect from offering a charitable gift as a substitute for a traditional gift.   
In all treatments, the same five pictures and project descriptions were presented to 
subjects.  Those in the both and valentine treatments were able to choose among the projects if 
they wished, or allow the charity to choose for them by selecting “where most needed” – a 
commonly provided category in reality.  Subjects in these treatments also saw prices framed as 
“suggested gift amounts,” along with an additional line in the project description indicating what 
a particular price would buy.  As in the previous chapter, an even distribution of prices was 
utilized ($4, $8, $12, $16, $20) to avoid as much as possible effects from implicitly suggesting 
low or high expected contributions or norms, which could be inferred by subjects if the 
distribution of prices was skewed (as examples, Bardsley (2008) List (2007) and Kessler (2009) 
provide evidence that one can alter subjects’ perceptions of appropriate behavior by altering 
action spaces to include taking in games that traditionally allowed only giving).  To attain this 
even distribution, items from the Samaritan’s Purse and the Adventist Development and Relief 
Association (henceforth, ADRA) gift catalogues were utilized.
1
  The five items were milk, a 
                                                 
1
 Samaritan’s Purse was chosen for three reasons.  First, it guarantees that contributions designated to a particular 
project will be utilized for that project or a very similar project if the project is completed.  Second, it provides a rather 
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soccer ball, school supplies, clean water for a family, and hot lunches for a month, corresponding 
to the five respective price points listed above.  Subjects were told that items came from two 
different charities, but the names were not revealed until the end of the experiment.  Subjects in 
the valentine treatment saw in the experiment instructions the additional information and card 
that appear below in Figure 1.  The red box below the example card displays what subjects saw 
on the decision screen that followed.   
 
 
Figure 1: Additional Information in the Valentine treatment 
 
The experiment was conducted in an online laboratory, providing a relatively broad set of 
demographics.  Subjects ranged in age from 20 to 73, in income from under $5000 to over 
$100,000, and in education from holding less than a high school diploma to holding a graduate 
degree, though most of the subjects were relatively highly educated.  Subjects were recruited via 
                                                                                                                                                             
extensive catalogue, which allowed/allows for other experiments to contain different items while holding the charity 
constant.  Third, the Samaritan’s Purse catalogue was the catalyst for the ideas behind this paper.  The Adventist 
Development and Relief Agency contained projects at the required price points and also guaranteed funding would 
be used where designated.  Additionally, its project descriptions and pictures were similar to those of Samaritan’s 
Purse, keeping the visual stimulus similar between projects.   
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e-mail through eLab, an online panel of survey and experiment participants maintained by Owen 
Graduate School of Management at Vanderbilt University.  The subject pool has grown to about 
80,000 participants who file tax information with the university, eliminating the possibility of 
duplicates.  Participants provide many controls upon signing up (such as age and education), 
reducing the need for post-experiment surveys or at least reducing their length.  94 subjects 
signed on between January 25
th
 and February 1
st
, 2010, and they were randomly assigned to 
treatments.  Of those subjects, 91 completed the experiment (97% of responders).  12 were 
removed due to inconsistencies,
2
 and 3 did not complete enough of the survey to provide controls 
and consistency checks, leaving us with 76 observations with controls.  Screenshots of the 
experiment and survey appear in the appendix.  A summary of subject characteristics appears in 
Table 1.  
 
                                                 
2
 Among the dropped subjects, some provided ages (through birth years) below that of their responses when signing 
up with eLab, calling into question the validity of the other controls they provided.  Other subjects incorrectly 
answered a question in the survey that indicated they were not paying attention.  Subjects were asked to estimate the 
giving of other subjects in the experiment, which could be at most $20.  Subjects entering amounts greater than $20 
were either paying no attention or trying to confuse results, so they were removed from the dataset, though their 
inclusion or exclusion did little to affect results.   
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3  Results 
Average giving for the online experiment in Chapter 1 was $13.53, with an average 
conditional on giving of $14.99; 90% of subjects donated something and 44% donated 
everything.  In the experiment examined here the summary statistics were similar with an 
average of $13.30.  84% of subjects gave something in the experiment and 43% contributed the 
All Neither Both Valentines
Subjects 76 23 28 25
Gave in the Experiment 86.84% 78.26% 89.29% 92.00%
Average conditional on giving $15.32 $13.61 $15.56 $16.39
Unconditional average $13.30 $10.65 $13.89 $15.08
Given to charity last year $1,052.40 $866.96 $1,147.14 $1,116.88
Heard of Samaritan's Purse 22.37% 13.04% 25.00% 28.00%
Donated to Samaritan's Purse 5.26% 4.35% 7.14% 4.00%
Heard of ADRA 5.26% 0.00% 3.57% 12.00%
Donated to ADRA 1.32% 0.00% 0.00% 4.00%
Age 45 43 48 42
Male 40.79% 43.48% 46.43% 32.00%
Single, never married 22.37% 26.09% 21.43% 20.00%
Married 47.37% 56.52% 53.57% 32.00%
Divorced/Separated 18.42% 4.35% 21.43% 28.00%
Widowed 6.58% 8.70% 3.57% 8.00%
Domestic Partner 5.26% 4.35% 0.00% 12.00%
Income < $5,000 3.95% 4.35% 7.14% 0.00%
$5,000-$9,999 5.26% 8.70% 3.57% 4.00%
$10,000-$14,999 9.21% 8.70% 7.14% 12.00%
$15,000-$24,999 7.89% 4.35% 7.14% 12.00%
$25,000-$34,999 10.53% 8.70% 7.14% 16.00%
$35,000-$49,999 18.42% 26.09% 14.29% 16.00%
$50,000-$74,999 23.68% 17.39% 25.00% 28.00%
$75,000-$99,000 14.47% 21.74% 21.43% 0.00%
$100,000 + 6.58% 0.00% 7.14% 12.00%
Less than High School 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
High School 13.16% 17.39% 10.71% 12.00%
Some College 36.84% 30.43% 35.71% 44.00%
College 27.63% 30.43% 25.00% 28.00%
Some Graduate Studies 5.26% 4.35% 7.14% 4.00%
Graduate Degree 17.11% 17.39% 21.43% 12.00%
Democrat 36.84% 30.43% 42.86% 36.00%
Republican 30.26% 34.78% 28.57% 28.00%
Independent 27.63% 30.43% 21.43% 32.00%
Other 5.26% 4.35% 7.14% 4.00%
Asian 2.63% 0.00% 3.57% 4.00%
Black 2.63% 0.00% 3.57% 4.00%
Hispanic 3.95% 0.00% 7.14% 4.00%
White 90.79% 100.00% 85.71% 88.00%
Other 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Religious (1/week or more) 26.32% 34.78% 25.00% 20.00%
Religious (1/month or more) 32.89% 47.83% 28.57% 24.00%
Jewish 5.26% 13.04% 0.00% 4.00%
Hindu 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Muslim 1.32% 0.00% 0.00% 4.00%
Catholic 30.26% 30.43% 39.29% 20.00%
Protestant 42.11% 39.13% 50.00% 36.00%
No religion 10.53% 13.04% 7.14% 12.00%
Other 10.53% 4.35% 3.57% 24.00%
Table 1:  Subject Characteristics
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entire endowment; the average conditional on giving was $15.32.  These similar results are 
intriguing when we recall that contributions in the previous experiment were matched at a rate of 
50% and contributions were unmatched in the experiment described here.  A variety of prior 
work indicates that lowering the effective cost of donating (what a match does) has a significant 
positive effect on behavior (Eckel and Grossman, 2003 and 2006, and Karlan and List, 2007, to 
name a few).  Thus, we would expect giving to be lower in this experiment than in the last.  
However, this experiment was run just days after the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti, and past 
experience indicates that altruistic behavior rises across the board in the wake of tragedy 
(Fischer, 1994, and Tierney, 2001, cited in Steinberg and Rooney, 2009).  Additionally, though 
each experiment shares two of the same treatments, the other treatments differ, which could help 
to explain the interesting equality of averages even under differing match rates.   
The averages given in each treatment display some differences, with more contributed by 
those in the both treatment as well as those in the valentine treatment compared with the neither 
treatment (Table 2).  Conditional on giving, average contributions in the valentine treatment are 
still higher than average donations in the neither treatment, indicating a difference on both the 
extensive and intensive margins.  Additionally, whether or not we include the subjects who 
utilized the option of donating in honor of somebody special (and receiving a card to present to 
them), the valentine treatment generates higher contributions than the baseline neither treatment, 
with or without conditioning on giving.  The means of the both and valentine treatments are not 
significantly different from each other whether or not we condition on giving, though we will 
start to see some differences between these two treatments shortly.   
First, it is interesting to note that 6 out of 25 people in the valentine treatment requested a 
card.  While the absolute number is small, it amounts to 24% of the subjects in that condition, 
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and 26% of the donors.  This high percentage provides evidence that the nonprofit has 
successfully transformed a charitable gift into a viable substitute for a traditional gift.   
 
 
 
 If we examine the cumulative distribution functions for each treatment in Figure 2 below, 
and test for differences (reported in Table 3), we see a similar story emerge as found above.  The 
both and valentine treatments are resulting in higher contributions than the baseline, neither, and 
their distributions stochastically dominate that of the neither treatment – for any given 
contribution level, the percentage of subjects contributing more than that level is greater in the 
both or valentine treatment than in the neither baseline.  It appears that the treatments result in 
more giving than the baseline, largely due to many $20 contributions, as Figure 3 displays, 
though we see no significant additional effect from including the Valentine gift option … yet.   
 
Neither  treatment (23) $10.65 Valentines  treatment (25) $15.08**
     Donors (18) $13.61      Donors (23) $16.39^^
          Choosing (15) $15.47
          Not choosing (8) $18.13
Both  treatment (28) $13.89* Valentines split by card requests
     Donors (25) $15.56      No card requested (19) $14.58**
          Choosing (20) $15.70           Donors (17) $16.29^
          Not choosing (5) $15.00      Card requested (6) $16.67
          Choosing (4) $15.00
          Not choosing (2) $20.00
Table 2:  Average Giving by Treatment
***, **, and * denote significant differences from the neither  treatment at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels (one-tailed t-tests).  Carats are used similarly to denote differences conditional on giving.  The 
number of subjects in each group is in parentheses.  
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Figure 2:  CDF’s of Contribution Amounts: % of Subjects Contributing $X or Less, by Treatment 
 
 
Figure 3:  PDF’s of Contribution Amounts: % of Subjects Contributing Each Amount, by Treatment 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
$0 $2 $4 $6 $8 $10 $12 $14 $16 $18 $20
Neither
Both
Valentines
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
$0 $2 $4 $6 $8 $10 $12 $14 $16 $18 $20
Neither
Both
Valentines
0.077 WMW
0.029 KS
0.020 0.562 WMW
0.042 0.930 KS
Both
Valentines
p-values reported from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
(WMW) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests.  
Table 3:  Distribution Tests
Neither Both
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If we split the sample by age, we find interesting results.  As we saw in Chapter 1, 
treatments tend to produce opposite effects for the older and younger halves of the sample.  We 
find significant positive effects of the valentine treatment relative to neither on contributions 
from the younger half of the sample, indicated in Table 4.  Among the young, those in the 
valentine treatment give significantly more than those in the both treatment as well (t-test p-
values of 0.001 for the two treatment averages, 0.014 conditional on giving).  The young in the 
valentine treatment who did not request a card also gave significantly more than those in the both 
treatment (p-values of 0.008 and 0.049, unconditional and conditional on giving).  Additionally, 
those who did request a card gave significantly more than contributors in the both treatment (p-
value of 0.04).  Among the older, those in the valentine treatment give less than those in the both 
treatment (t-test p-values of 0.029 and 0.143, unconditional and conditional on giving).  The 
older in the valentine treatment who did not request a card also gave less than those in the both 
treatment (p-values of 0.035 and 0.223, unconditional and conditional on giving).  Finally, those 
who did request a card gave less than contributors in the both treatment as well (p-value of 0.11).   
 
 
 
Neither  treatment (12) $10.42 Valentines  treatment (13) $17.31*** Neither  treatment (11) $10.91 Valentines  treatment (12) $12.67
     Donors (9) $13.89      Donors (13) $17.31^      Donors (9) $13.33      Donors (10) $15.20
          Choosing (7) $15.71           Choosing (8) $15.25
          Not choosing (6) $19.17           Not choosing (2) $15.00
Both  treatment (12) $8.92 Valentines split by card requests Both  treatment (16) $17.63*** Valentines split by card requests
     Donors (9) $11.89      No card requested (9) $16.67**      Donors (16) 17.63^^      No card requested (10) $12.70
          Choosing (8) $12.75           Donors (9) $16.67           Choosing (12) $17.67           Donors (8) $15.88
          Not choosing (1) $5.00      Card requested (4) 18.75^           Not choosing (4) $17.50      Card requested (2) $12.50
          Choosing (2) $17.50           Choosing (2) $12.50
          Not choosing (2) $20.00           Not choosing (0)
***, **, and * denote significant differences from the neither  treatment at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed t-tests).  Carats are used similarly to denote differences conditional on giving.  
The number of subjects in each group is in parentheses.  
Table 4:  Average Giving by Treatment
45 and Older (39)     $14.21Younger than 45 (37)     $12.35
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It is interesting to note that behavior in the both treatment relative to the baseline is 
different here than in the previous chapter.  The both treatment produces relatively high 
contribution levels among the older and typical contribution levels among the younger (relative 
to the neither treatment for each respective group), the opposite of the finding in Chapter 1, 
where the both treatment produced relatively large contributions from the young and average 
contributions from the older (again, relative to the donations of the respective age groups in the 
neither treatment).  Opposite effects appear once more when splitting by age.  These effects can 
be seen quite clearly in Figure 4, which highlights the differences in the distributions of 
contributions by the older and by the younger in the both and in the valentine treatments.   
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Figure 4:  CDF’s of Contribution Amounts by Treatment (Split by Age) 
 
Though the above graphs might seem to contradict the findings of Chapter 1, recall that 
either age group could witness more or less giving in the both treatment relative to the baseline 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
$0 $2 $4 $6 $8 $10 $12 $14 $16 $18 $20
Neither - Y
Both - Y
Valentines - Y
Neither - O
Both - O
Valentines - O
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
$0 $2 $4 $6 $8 $10 $12 $14 $16 $18 $20
Neither - Y
Both - Y
Valentines - Y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
$0 $2 $4 $6 $8 $10 $12 $14 $16 $18 $20
Neither - O
Both - O
Valentines - O
79 
 
depending upon the sign of the combined effect of choice, prices, and their interaction.  The 
three effects were negative, negative, and positive for the young and positive, positive, and 
negative for the older.  Thus, the overall effect of the both treatment for either group could 
display either sign relative to the baseline for that group.   
Of particular interest in this paper, Figure 4 also indicates that the distribution of 
contributions among the young in the valentine treatment stochastically dominates the 
distribution of contributions from the young in either of the other treatments, and these 
differences are statistically significant.  Table 5 reports p-values from distribution equality tests, 
confirming the graphical findings above, and Figure 5 displays probability density functions, 
illustrating how treatments are affecting behavior at corners.  The valentine treatment results in 
relatively few maximum contributions among the older and relatively frequent minimum 
contributions while, among the young, it results in no $0’s and many $20’s.  Perhaps the older 
see the Valentine option as a substitute for a traditional gift and think, “No thanks,” whereas the 
young like the idea.  Or perhaps the young see the gift option as packing double the punch - they 
can contribute to charity and get a substitute Valentine gift thrown in, or they can purchase a 
Valentine gift and get a charitable contribution thrown in.  Whether substituting for a traditional 
gift or adding to it, the significant differences witnessed suggest that the Valentine option is 
altering something in objective functions, and perhaps even constraints as well.   
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Figure 5:  PDF’s of Contribution Amounts by Treatment (Split by Age) 
0.638 WMW 0.004 WMW
0.913 KS 0.005 KS
0.017 0.006 WMW 0.467 0.104 WMW
0.064 0.019 KS 0.476 0.442 KS
0.900 0.002 0.208 WMW
1.000 0.011 0.343 KS
p-values reported from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests.  
Both Both
Neither Both Neither
Table 5:  Distribution Tests
Younger than 45 45 and Older
Neither Both Valentines
Cross-age Comparisons
Valentines Valentines
Both
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Neither - O
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Regression results in Table 6 confirm the graphical findings.  We estimate Two-way 
Censored Tobit and OLS models, the latter both unconditional and conditional on giving.
3
  
Demand for giving is estimated by “splitting” the sample by age and interacting indicators for 
each respective half with treatment indicators (specifications (1)-(3)).
4
  Binary controls are 
included to account for income, gender, religious attendance,
5
 political affiliation, marital status, 
ethnicity, and broad categories of religious affiliation (Protestant and Catholic).  Age was 
controlled for as well.  Self-reported giving to charitable organizations from the previous year 
was also included, as was an indicator for subjects who had previously donated to Samaritan’s 
Purse or ADRA (6.6% of the sample), though significance of our variables of interest are 
unaffected by its inclusion.  Income data are categorical with a median category containing 
income in the range of $35,000-$49,000.  The 14 individuals in this category were included in 
the low income group when creating a binary income variable, which resulted in a 55/45 split.  
Such a split seems reasonable given the median household income of $52,175 reported by the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s 2006-2008 American Community Survey, and it allows for ease of 
comparability with the previous chapter.  Similarly, education was also categorical with a 
                                                 
3
 Following the experimental literature on charitable giving (see, for example, Eckel and Grossman, 2003, Karlan and 
List, 2007, Breman, 2009, etc.), which estimates Tobit, Conditional OLS, and/or Unconditional OLS models, we utilize 
all three.  Although the use of OLS would appear to constitute a naïve approach when we consider that there are 
bounds on giving in this experiment, Angrist and Pischke (2009) note that in an environment where 0’s represent 
actual observations rather than censored observations, OLS coefficients may provide useful “average” effects.  
However, there could exist a latent variable taking on negative values if we consider it possible that some people 
would take from charity if allowed.  Additionally, we witness contributions at the upper bound of $20, accounting for 
everybody who would contribute $20, as well as those who would contribute more if allowed.  Since it is plausible that 
a latent variable, taking on values below 0 or (more likely) greater than 20, exists, the Two-way Censored Tobit 
appears to be a good choice of model.  OLS results are reported as well to satisfy readers and to provide a 
robustness check of sorts.  Conditioning on giving allows us to satisfy those with a typical concern about utilizing a 
Tobit model, mentioned in Wooldridge (2002) – that the effect of a variable on the probability of giving is assumed to 
have the same sign as the effect on the amount given conditional on positive giving.  Coefficient estimates from the 
OLS specifications indicate that the signs are indeed the same for our variables of interest – the added effects of the 
valentines treatment, as reported in specifications (4)-(6).   
4
 Though “splitting” as detailed above does include some implicit assumptions that controls affect giving in the same 
way, regardless of age group, results from the previous chapter are similar if we split the sample entirely.  This 
sample is rather small to meaningfully do so here.  If we go ahead for curiosity’s sake, coefficient estimates remain 
similar.   
5
 1 = once or more per week, similar to Brooks (2006).  While this definition is relatively Christian-centric, the dataset 
is largely composed of subjects falling under the category of “Christian” or no category at all, with relatively few from 
other faiths.  Thus, the definition of “religious” as attending on a weekly basis seems reasonable.   
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median between “some college” and “college.”  Thus a binary variable for high education 
separates along that line, the same dividing line used previously.  The median age of the sample 
was 45.  When splitting by age, the 4 individuals of that age are included with the older group.
 6
   
 
 
                                                 
6
 Age and age-squared are included along with the young-old indicator as we have evidence that the relationship 
between age and giving is quadratic (Clotfelter, 2002).   
Dependent Variable:  
Tobit Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y*both treatment -2.232 -1.687 1.190 Y*both -2.232 -1.687 1.190
(6.635)         (3.875)         (3.012)         (6.635)         (3.875)         (3.012)         
Y*valentines treatment 17.71*** 7.322** 4.914* Y*valentines 19.94*** 9.009*** 3.723
(6.554)         (3.004)         (2.653)         (6.706)         (3.052)         (2.707)         
Younger than 45 -1.374 -0.668 -1.947 -1.374 -0.668 -1.947
(7.181)         (4.180)         (3.144)         (7.181)         (4.180)         (3.144)         
O*both treatment 15.81** 6.131** 2.144 O*both 15.81** 6.131** 2.144
(6.130)         (3.019)         (2.520)         (6.130)         (3.019)         (2.520)         
O*valentines treatment -1.150 -0.416 1.281 O*valentines -16.96** -6.546* -0.862
(6.284)         (3.686)         (2.731)         (7.545)         (3.468)         (2.624)         
Age 1.268 0.260 -0.414 1.268 0.260 -0.414
(0.878)         (0.417)         (0.369)         (0.878)         (0.417)         (0.369)         
Age squared -0.011 -0.002 0.005 -0.011 -0.002 0.005
(0.009)         (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.009)         (0.004)         (0.004)         
High income 5.600 1.869 2.859* 5.600 1.869 2.859*
(3.733)         (2.020)         (1.646)         (3.733)         (2.020)         (1.646)         
Male -3.963 -1.552 -2.660* -3.963 -1.552 -2.660*
(3.700)         (1.957)         (1.567)         (3.700)         (1.957)         (1.567)         
Married -6.346 -2.115 0.864 -6.346 -2.115 0.864
(3.981)         (1.778)         (1.754)         (3.981)         (1.778)         (1.754)         
Single 4.254 0.843 0.734 4.254 0.843 0.734
(5.294)         (2.587)         (2.540)         (5.294)         (2.587)         (2.540)         
High education 3.621 1.260 2.172 3.621 1.260 2.172
(3.748)         (1.901)         (1.395)         (3.748)         (1.901)         (1.395)         
Religious -1.854 -1.158 -1.534 -1.854 -1.158 -1.534
(4.755)         (2.730)         (2.337)         (4.755)         (2.730)         (2.337)         
Democrat 5.540 2.308 0.931 5.540 2.308 0.931
(4.417)         (2.264)         (1.796)         (4.417)         (2.264)         (1.796)         
Republican 4.445 1.347 -0.210 4.445 1.347 -0.210
(4.130)         (2.110)         (1.952)         (4.130)         (2.110)         (1.952)         
White 5.757 2.964 6.550*** 5.757 2.964 6.550***
(5.891)         (3.011)         (2.325)         (5.891)         (3.011)         (2.325)         
Donated before -6.979 -1.030 5.281* -6.979 -1.030 5.281*
(9.842)         (5.087)         (2.924)         (9.842)         (5.087)         (2.924)         
Charitable contributions 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.000)         (0.000)         
Catholic -8.842 -2.194 0.232 -8.842 -2.194 0.232
(5.508)         (2.684)         (2.248)         (5.508)         (2.684)         (2.248)         
Protestant -3.883 -1.633 -0.430 -3.883 -1.633 -0.430
(4.497)         (2.253)         (1.962)         (4.497)         (2.253)         (1.962)         
Constant -26.050 1.374 15.080 -26.050 1.374 15.080
(21.810)       (10.530)       (9.749)         (21.810)       (10.530)       (9.749)         
Pseudo/R-squared 0.10 0.32 0.36 0.10 0.32 0.36
Prob > F 0.0329 0.0021 0.0011 0.0329 0.0021 0.0011
Observations 76 76 66 76 76 66
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Table 6:  Regression Results, Unconditional and Conditional on Giving
Amount Given
OLS OLS
10 left-censored, 33 uncensored, 33 right-censored.
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In specifications (1)-(3) we see that, among the younger, the valentine treatment yields 
significantly higher contributions than the baseline.  Accounting for the fact that the valentine 
treatment also contains elements of the both treatment – both choice and prices – we see in the 
second set of results, specifications (4)-(6), that the added effect of the valentine treatment on top 
of the both treatment (as opposed to the entire effect from comparing it with the baseline, which 
is provided in specifications (1)-(3)) is positive and significant for the younger, and negative and 
significant for the older; both yields an insignificant effect among the young and a positive and 
significant effect among the older.  Though different from the findings of Chapter 1, again, 
results are still consistent with those found previously since the effect of “both” here depends on 
the effects from choice, prices, and their interaction.  In the previous chapter, we were able to 
separate these effects.  Here we have only a combined effect.  The results of Chapter 1 indicated 
that the combined effect could be either positive or negative for either age group, and here the 
coefficient on “both” is the combined effect.  Similar to the previous chapter, controls are rarely 
significant in this sample, with even fewer significant coefficients than we found in Chapter 1.
7
   
The more interesting point, in this paper at least, is the added effect from the valentine 
treatment.  When controlling for the components of both that appear in valentine (specifications 
(4)-(6)), we still find a positive and significant effect among the young and we find a negative 
and significant effect among the older.  That is, the added effect of valentine on top of both 
increases contributions of the young and decreases contributions of the older, yielding a 
significant effect from allowing a charitable gift purchase to substitute for (or add to) a 
traditional gift purchase, and indicating that something quirky is happening in the minds of 
potential donors.  If they viewed a transaction in the valentine treatment as merely a charitable 
                                                 
7
 Results are similar when varied groups, or all of the controls, are dropped, though we lose significance of valentine 
for the older when very few controls are included.   
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gift purchase, we should have witnessed no added effect.  However, if they view the transaction 
as a substitute for a traditional gift purchase, or if it appears to create a two-for-one special, we 
should expect to find added effects, which we do.   
 
4  Discussion 
Considering the findings above – a significant positive added effect of the valentine 
treatment on contributions from the young and a significant negative added effect on 
contributions from the older half of the sample – the first inclination might be to think that these 
results are simply picking up a “glow” from the holiday (or the mention of it and the appearance 
of the pretty red card) that exists for the younger half but is lacking (or even negative) for the 
older half of the sample.
8
  However, when we speak of “the young” in this paper, we are not 
exactly referring to love-struck teenagers.  The younger half of the sample is comprised of 
people living in their third, fourth, and some in their fifth decades of life.  Surely the girl next 
door has moved away, and Prince Charming has revealed himself to be less than charming on 
occasion.  Additionally, it is unclear why the older would necessarily dislike Valentine’s Day 
relative to the younger.  Though unwilling (and unable) to rule it out completely, the 
composition of the sample would suggest that something other than holiday warm fuzzies (or 
lack thereof) is driving the results.  The large percentage of contributors who requested a card 
would imply that for them, at least, the nonprofit has provided a viable Valentine gift which, if 
coded differently than a charitable gift, could help explain the differences in contributions 
between the both and valentine treatments (when split by age).  The different effects for different 
                                                 
8
 Andreoni (1989, 1990) formalized the idea that giving may result in a “warm glow” or utility component that is not 
attributable to the outcome of that giving but rather to the knowledge that one gave and how much.  Valentine’s Day 
reminders could enhance that glow for some (and perhaps diminish it for others), not inconsistent with the intuition 
among nonprofits and those who study their behavior that the Christmas season may be particularly fruitful for 
donations as a result of holiday cheer (Steinberg and Rooney, 2009).   
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age groups are still somewhat intriguing though, as we found in the previous chapter, not 
unusual.   
Another reason that might come to mind to explain the results is the composition of 
marital status by age group.  However, it is unclear what our assumption should be about marital 
status and a need, or lack of need, for a substitute for a Valentine gift.  Among those requesting a 
card, 4 were married, one was single, and one had a domestic partner, although others may have 
told their significant others about the contribution without requesting a card.  Additionally, the 
numbers are so small that further splits beyond age will render doubtful results.  In the valentine 
treatment, there were 5 single people, 8 married, 2 widowed, 7 divorced/separated, and 3 with 
domestic partners.  There were no single people among the older in the valentine treatment, and 
fewer married people in the valentine treatment than in the other treatments (8 in total – about a 
third of the subjects versus closer to half for the other treatments – with 4 in each age group).  If 
we were to split the sample by marital status instead of age, it is unclear who should belong to 
which group, so we refrain from doing so and allow that the composition of marital status by age 
group may be having some effect on the results found, as differing marital status might yield 
differing need for a substitute for a Valentine gift (or differing like or dislike of Valentine’s Day 
which, unfortunately, we cannot rule out).   
Finally, the composition of gender among the two age groups could be driving the results 
if we have reason to believe that one group is more likely to be in need of a Valentine gift than 
another, making a substitute gift more appealing to one group than another.  If, instead of 
splitting the sample by age, we split by gender, we find no evidence of this argument.  While the 
first of the three explanations offered above – positive or negative feelings towards the holiday – 
would blight our theory, either of the last two explanations, if they held, could still be consistent 
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with a theory suggesting that contributions may change when a charitable gift can substitute for a 
traditional gift (or add to it).  If one group (married, single, etc., male, female) is in more need of 
a Valentine gift, that group could also be in more need of a substitute for it (or addition to it), 
which could account for the added Valentine effects seen.  Similarly, if two groups differ in their 
mental coding of the transaction, with one counting it as a charitable gift purchase and another 
counting it as a traditional gift purchase, or with one counting it once and another “double 
counting” it, we could see differences in behavior similar to those witnessed here.   
 
5  Concluding Remarks 
Donors often show themselves to be easily persuaded by different solicitation techniques 
or giving environments.  Andreoni (1995) finds that people are more charitable in public goods 
games when adding to a public pot than when taking from it.  Falk (2007) notes that potential 
donors in the field are more likely to respond when a small gift is included in the solicitation.  
Yoruk (2009) utilizes survey data and IRS data to find that one can increase the likelihood of 
giving simply by asking.  Breman (2009) provides evidence that giving will increase more if one 
asks current donors to commit to increases in their future donations than if one asks them to 
commit to increases today.  All of these findings indicate that donors and potential donors are 
sensitive to the marketing strategies of nonprofits.  Thus, we might think that our subjects here 
were simply warmed or chilled by the reminder that Valentine’s Day was approaching.  
However, even if the effects we have seen are merely due to added “glow” (or “dis-glow”) from 
the holiday, a reason that we cannot completely rule out, the valentine treatment performed 
considerably well overall, regardless of the reason.  A charity that cannot differentiate based on 
demographic characteristics might find such a holiday reminder and gift replacement option a 
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useful asset in increasing contributions.  However, the relatively high percentage of subjects in 
the valentine treatment who requested a card suggests that there is something else at work here.  
Perhaps that something is the creation of a substitute for or addition to a traditional gift, altering 
the utility argument into which the good is placed, or perhaps even the budget account from 
which the expense is drawn.  Future work will aim to distinguish more completely the effect of 
one-stop shopping from a charitable gift catalogue.   
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Appendix:  Experiment Screens 
Screen 1 asked subjects about internet connection capabilities for the benefit of eLab.   
 
Screen 2, Neither and Both treatments 
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Screen 2, Valentine treatment 
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Screen 3, parts 1 & 2, Neither treatment 
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Screen3, Both treatment 
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Screen 3, part 1, Valentine treatment 
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Screen 3, part 2, Valentine treatment 
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The following transition screen and survey screens appeared in all treatments.  In the 
Neither treatment, Question (6) read: What do you think it costs to provide the goods described 
previously (they appear in no particular order):   
 
Transition Screen and Survey Screens, All treatments 
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Conclusion Screen, All treatments 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RISK AVERSION, NO INCENTIVE EFFECTS 
 
1  Introduction 
Experiments have been used throughout the behavioral literature of such disciplines as 
economics, psychology, and sociology because of their ability to test hypotheses in controlled 
laboratory settings.  Unfortunately, control can come at a cost – there often exists a tradeoff 
between reality and tractability.  One such tradeoff may occur when experiments ask subjects to 
make decisions for small rewards.  Indeed, a common criticism of experimental research stems 
from the possibility that subjects may behave differently when they are playing with the small 
amounts of money present in experiments than they would when making important decisions 
having large financial consequences.   
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue for hypothetical payments to avoid the artificial 
nature of laboratory experiments with small incentives, their premise being that subjects will be 
able to accurately report how they would behave if large incentives were real.  However, Holt 
and Laury (2002) find that subjects behave in a vastly different manner when stakes are large and 
hypothetical than they do when stakes are large and real, diminishing the appeal of high 
hypothetical stakes.  They compare behavior under cases of low, high, and high hypothetical 
stakes and note that subjects behave in a more risk-averse manner when stakes are high than 
when they are low, but that high hypothetical stakes do not elicit the risk-averse behavior that 
high real stakes do (Holt and Laury, 2002).  But paying high real stakes is costly.  Is there a 
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method for obtaining risk-averse behavior without the expense of typical high stakes 
experiments?   
We have information on risk attitudes for a broad range of stake sizes, and we have 
information on risk attitudes when the probability of payment is one (real payments) and when 
the probability of payment is zero (hypothetical payments), but we still need more analysis of 
risk attitudes when stakes are high but the probability of payment is between zero and one.  
Though many studies of risk behavior utilize multiple-decision lottery-choice tasks in which only 
one decision is paid and, thus, the probability of payment for any single decision among the 
group is less than one, we have much less information about risk attitudes when the probability 
of any payment (beyond a show-up fee) is less than one.  If increasing the probability of payment 
from zero to one leads to an increase in risk-averse behavior when stakes are high, it is plausible 
that increasing the probability of payment from zero to something less than one will provide a 
similar result, so long as subjects focus on the stake size more than the probability of payment.   
Bolle (1990) provides a similar supposition about experimental behavior in general rather 
than specifically with respect to risk aversion.  He finds some evidence in support of the idea that 
subjects focus on stake size rather than the probability of payment in an ultimatum game 
environment.  Behavior when subjects are proposing/rejecting offers splitting DM20 is similar to 
behavior when subjects are proposing/rejecting offers splitting DM20 with probability 0.1.  
Presumably at some point, however, if the probability of payment were low enough, the focus 
would shift to it rather than remain transfixed by stake size, as the Holt-Laury (2002) 
experiments would suggest.  In them subjects behave very differently when the probability of 
payment is zero than when it is one, at least when stakes are high.   
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When does this shift in focus occur, and does it occur gradually or is there a tipping 
point?  If it occurs gradually – that is, if subjects are sensitive to the expected payment – 
decreasing the probability of payment would require a simultaneous increase in stake size, which 
would not lower experiment costs.  Again, at least in the ultimatum game environment, Bolle 
(1990) provides some useful evidence.  When playing for a 10% chance of DM200, proposers 
behave differently than when playing for DM20.  In specific, they become more “risk averse” in 
their offers (very few offered less than 35% of the pot) when the stake size increased even 
though the expected payment remained constant.  Such behavior, combined with the Holt and 
Laury (2002) findings, implies that rather than a gradual shift of focus from stake size to 
probability of payment, there may be a tipping point.  If so, then by lowering the probability of 
payment to that point, we could lower the cost of experiments while having no effect on behavior 
– we would achieve high stakes behavior at a low stakes cost.  Does this tipping point exist and, 
if so, where does it occur?   
In this project, we extend the Holt and Laury (2002) setup to include treatments in which 
the lotteries are played for large amounts of money, but only some subjects will be randomly 
chosen to actually have their choices carried out, though all will receive a small participation fee.  
We will hold constant the stakes but vary the probability of payment.  If people overweight the 
probability of unlikely events as Prospect Theory would suggest (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
even a small probability of a large payment may be sufficient to encourage subjects to take the 
tasks seriously.  If the experiment shows that a small probability of high pay induces risk 
aversion just as 100% probability of high pay does, then this payment mechanism would provide 
a low-cost, justifiable alternative to high stakes payments that still brings forth risk-averse, high 
stakes results.   
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2  Experiment Design 
In the experiment, the 20X stakes (relatively high stakes) treatment of the Holt-Laury 
experiment was adapted to computerized form by substituting card draws for die rolls.  In the 
Holt-Laury setup, subjects make a series of decisions in which they choose between a relatively 
safe lottery (option A below) and a relatively risky lottery (option B below).  The lottery 
outcomes remain constant but with each successive decision, the probability of the better 
outcome increases until the final decision is reached, in which the lotteries are degenerate.  Table 
1 illustrates.  Though the original Holt-Laury task contained only ten rounds, we include eleven 
(the additional round is the first) for symmetry.  A subject’s degree of risk tolerance is gauged by 
examining the number of safe lotteries chosen before switching to the risky option in the 
remaining rounds.  A risk-neutral subject will choose Option A for the first 5 rounds and switch 
to Option B in the sixth round and beyond.  After subjects made all of their decisions, one 
decision was randomly chosen, as in Holt and Laury (2002).  The decision was “played out,” 
though not necessarily for payment, as detailed below.   
 
 
Round/ 
Decision
Option A Option B
1 100% chance of $32 100% chance of $2
2 10% chance of $40; 90% chance of $32 10% chance of $77; 90% chance of $2
3 20% chance of $40; 80% chance of $32 20% chance of $77; 80% chance of $2
4 30% chance of $40; 70% chance of $32 30% chance of $77; 70% chance of $2
5 40% chance of $40; 60% chance of $32 40% chance of $77; 60% chance of $2
6 50% chance of $40; 50% chance of $32 50% chance of $77; 50% chance of $2
7 60% chance of $40; 40% chance of $32 60% chance of $77; 40% chance of $2
8 70% chance of $40; 30% chance of $32 70% chance of $77; 30% chance of $2
9 80% chance of $40; 20% chance of $32 80% chance of $77; 20% chance of $2
10 90% chance of $40; 10% chance of $32 90% chance of $77; 10% chance of $2
11 100% chance of $40 100% chance of $77
Table 1:  Lottery Choice Decisions
107 
 
The Holt-Laury treatments vary the size of the stakes and pay subjects with a probability 
of either zero or one.  In this paper, stake size is held constant and high, but the probability of 
payment is varied more continuously by including treatments with 0% (=hypothetical), 10%, 
20%, 30%, and 100% (=real) probability of payment.  Subjects were randomly assigned to 
treatments.  Instructions remained as similar as possible between treatments, though the 
instructions in the hypothetical treatment clearly indicated that the experiment was hypothetical 
and would not result in payment beyond the show-up fee.  Instructions in the real treatment 
clearly indicated that the payment was real.  Instructions in the other three treatments described 
how a 10%, 20%, or 30% probability of payment would be carried out.  All subjects who 
completed the study received a $5 show-up fee in addition to any lottery earnings.   
In all treatments, to determine which of the eleven decisions was randomly chosen, a 
deck of eleven computerized cards, one for each decision, was shuffled electronically.  One card 
was chosen by the subject, then whichever round was on the underside of that card was played 
out.  That is, the lottery of the option that the subject had chosen in that decision round was 
implemented via another deck of computerized cards.  This deck contained 100 cards, 
corresponding to the odds for the chosen lottery.  For example, if the chosen lottery paid $5 with 
probability .2 and $10 with probability .8, the deck had 20 cards with a “$5” label and 80 cards 
with a “$10” label.  For those subjects in the hypothetical and real treatments, no other events 
occurred in the experiment.  For the subjects in the 10%, 20%, or 30% treatments, an additional 
deck of 100 cards determined whether or not they would be paid.  Subjects again shuffled an 
online deck, then clicked on a card.  If the underside read “yes,” the subject was paid.  If it read 
“no,” the subject was not paid (beyond the show-up fee).  The number of “yes” and “no” cards 
corresponded to the probability of payment.  After any of the above-mentioned card-shufflings, 
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subjects would click on a “reveal” button, showing them the undersides of all the cards, which 
allowed them to see that the odds were not stacked against them.  Animated instructions 
illustrated the sequence of events, but subjects did not participate in any practice rounds or other 
experiments beforehand.   
To summarize, subjects made 11 decisions, corresponding to the 11 rows in Table 1.  
Then they shuffled a deck of 11 cards to determine which decision round would be played out.  
They then shuffled a deck of 100 cards labeled according their chosen lottery (Option A or 
Option B) of the decision round just previously determined to find out their lottery winnings.  
Subjects in the 10%, 20%, and 30% treatments shuffled one more deck with cards labeled “yes” 
and “no” to find out if they would receive the lottery outcome.  Screenshots of the experiment 
appear in the appendix.   
The experiments were run on subjects drawn from an online subject pool maintained by 
eLab and the Owen Graduate School of Management at Vanderbilt University.  Subjects are 
recruited over time via online postings, resulting in a participant pool of about 80,000 people.  
They file tax information with the university, so duplicates are not a problem, and they provide 
many controls upon signing up (such as age and education), reducing the need for lengthy post-
experiment surveys.  This pool allows for much demographic diversity among subjects.  For 
example, subjects ranged in age from 20 to 62, in income from less than $10,000 to over 
$150,000 (though we do not have income data for all of the subjects, Table 1 specifies the 
number for which we do), and education from less than high school to having completed a 
graduate degree.  107 subjects signed on in June of 2009, and they were randomly assigned to 
treatments.  Of those subjects, 98 completed the experiment.  A summary of subject 
characteristics appears in Table 2 for subjects completing the experiment, subjects completing 
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with no major mistakes, and subjects completing with no mistakes.  Mistakes will be defined 
presently.   
 
 
 
3  Results 
Although subjects should have – assuming money was the only element of their payoff 
function for this experiment – chosen Option A in the first decision, chosen Option B in the last, 
and switched from A to B only once somewhere in the middle, we saw a variety of “interesting” 
behaviors.  On the whole, as Table 3 indicates, “interesting” behavior was roughly as prevalent 
in any given treatment as in any other and, from Table 2, we notice no great differences in 
characteristics between individuals who make mistakes and those who don’t.  Table 3 reports the 
number of incompletes, the number of major mistakes, and the number of minor mistakes.  
Incompletes account for people who signed off while reading the instructions (7) or before 
making all of their decisions (2).  A major mistake is defined as a choice of Option B in the first 
Treatment All 0% 10% 20% 30% 100% All 0% 10% 20% 30% 100% All 0% 10% 20% 30% 100%
Subjects 98 20 20 19 19 20 82 17 16 18 14 17 58 14 13 10 10 11
Age 40 39 42 40 39 41 40 39 41 41 37 41 40 39 39 41 38 45
Male 51.02% 40.00% 65.00% 73.68% 36.84% 40.00% 48.78% 35.29% 62.50% 72.22% 28.57% 41.18% 50.00% 35.71% 69.23% 80.00% 20.00% 45.45%
Less than High School 2.04% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.45% 0.00% 15.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
High School 15.31% 0.00% 5.00% 15.79% 31.58% 25.00% 9.76% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 21.43% 17.65% 8.62% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 18.18%
Some College 22.45% 10.00% 35.00% 26.32% 21.05% 20.00% 25.61% 11.76% 37.50% 27.78% 28.57% 23.53% 25.86% 14.29% 38.46% 20.00% 30.00% 27.27%
College 33.67% 65.00% 15.00% 31.58% 15.79% 40.00% 36.59% 64.71% 18.75% 33.33% 21.43% 41.18% 31.03% 57.14% 7.69% 40.00% 20.00% 27.27%
Some Graduate Study 8.16% 10.00% 20.00% 5.26% 5.26% 0.00% 8.54% 11.76% 18.75% 5.56% 7.14% 0.00% 10.34% 14.29% 23.08% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00%
Graduate Degree 18.37% 15.00% 15.00% 21.05% 26.32% 15.00% 17.07% 11.76% 12.50% 22.22% 21.43% 17.65% 20.69% 14.29% 15.38% 30.00% 20.00% 27.27%
Asian 3.06% 0.00% 0.00% 10.53% 5.26% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 1.72% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Black 4.08% 0.00% 5.00% 0.00% 5.26% 10.00% 3.66% 0.00% 6.25% 0.00% 7.14% 5.88% 5.17% 0.00% 7.69% 0.00% 10.00% 9.09%
Hispanic 2.04% 0.00% 0.00% 10.53% 0.00% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 1.72% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00%
White 88.78% 100.00% 95.00% 73.68% 89.47% 85.00% 89.02% 100.00% 93.75% 72.22% 92.86% 88.24% 89.66% 100.00% 92.31% 80.00% 90.00% 81.82%
Other 2.04% 0.00% 0.00% 5.26% 0.00% 5.00% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 5.56% 0.00% 5.88% 1.72% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.09%
Subjects 84 20 16 15 15 18 70 17 12 14 11 16 51 14 11 8 8 10
Income < $10,000 2.38% 0.00% 6.25% 6.67% 0.00% 0.00% 2.86% 0.00% 8.33% 7.14% 0.00% 0.00% 3.92% 0.00% 9.09% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00%
$10,000 to $14,999 5.95% 15.00% 0.00% 6.67% 6.67% 0.00% 7.14% 17.65% 0.00% 7.14% 9.09% 0.00% 3.92% 7.14% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 0.00%
$15,000 to $24,999 10.71% 5.00% 12.50% 6.67% 6.67% 22.22% 10.00% 5.88% 16.67% 7.14% 0.00% 18.75% 9.80% 7.14% 9.09% 0.00% 0.00% 30.00%
$25,000 to $34,999 10.71% 15.00% 6.25% 13.33% 6.67% 11.11% 12.86% 17.65% 8.33% 14.29% 9.09% 12.50% 11.76% 21.43% 9.09% 12.50% 0.00% 10.00%
$35,000 to $39,999 5.95% 5.00% 6.25% 0.00% 6.67% 11.11% 5.71% 5.88% 0.00% 0.00% 9.09% 12.50% 5.88% 7.14% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 10.00%
$40,000 to $49,999 13.10% 10.00% 25.00% 13.33% 6.67% 11.11% 14.29% 11.76% 33.33% 7.14% 9.09% 12.50% 17.65% 14.29% 36.36% 12.50% 12.50% 10.00%
$50,000 to $74,999 23.81% 20.00% 37.50% 13.33% 20.00% 27.78% 17.14% 17.65% 25.00% 14.29% 0.00% 25.00% 17.65% 21.43% 27.27% 12.50% 0.00% 20.00%
$75,000 to $99,999 8.33% 5.00% 6.25% 13.33% 13.33% 5.56% 8.57% 0.00% 8.33% 14.29% 18.18% 6.25% 7.84% 0.00% 9.09% 12.50% 12.50% 10.00%
$100,000 to $149,999 9.52% 5.00% 0.00% 13.33% 26.67% 5.56% 11.43% 5.88% 0.00% 14.29% 36.36% 6.25% 11.76% 7.14% 0.00% 12.50% 37.50% 10.00%
$150,000 + 9.52% 20.00% 0.00% 13.33% 6.67% 5.56% 10.00% 17.65% 0.00% 14.29% 9.09% 6.25% 9.80% 14.29% 0.00% 25.00% 12.50% 0.00%
Completed the Experiment Completed, No Major Mistakes Completed, No Mistakes
Table 2:  Subject Characteristics
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decision and/or a choice of Option A in the last decision.  A minor mistake involves a back-and-
forth switch which can be fixed by changing just one decision (e.g. A, A, A, A, A, B, A, B, B, 
B), though which one should be changed is debatable.   
 
 
 
Because of the many mistakes, results are quite jumbled, with all treatments yielding 
similar averages, medians, and distributions of safe choices.  Thus, results presented below 
exclude incompletes by necessity and major mistakes under the assumption that these people 
were not paying any attention whatsoever.  A minor mistake is handled in one of three ways:  (1) 
by assuming the subject meant to switch the first time he did so, (2) by assuming the subject 
meant to switch the last time he did so, (3) by assuming the subject did not know when he meant 
to switch (and omitting him from analysis).  The corresponding terminology we will use is (1) 
first switch, (2) last switch, and (3) switch (all mistakes dropped).  Table 4 summarizes the 
results under the first switch assumption, and Figure 1 illustrates graphically the distribution of 
safe choices by treatment in each round.  Recall that a risk-neutral person would choose Option 
A in the first five decisions (5 safe choices) and Option B after that.   
 
All 0% 10% 20% 30% 100%
Started Experiment 107 24 20 20 21 22
Completes 98 20 20 19 19 20
Incompletes 9 4 0 1 2 2
Major Mistakes 16 3 4 1 5 3
Minor Mistakes 24 3 3 8 4 6
"Problems" as % of Starters 46% 42% 35% 50% 52% 50%
Table 3:  Incompletes and Mistakes 
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 We notice no great differences among the means of safe choices by treatment, and the 
medians and modes would actually suggest that the higher probability of payment leads to less 
risk aversion, though the progression is nonlinear.  As the probability of payment increases, safe 
choices appear to first decrease then increase, though differences are not significant.  The 
graphical portrayal in Figure 1 displays entire distributions of safe choices, though they are 
relatively similar as well.  Table 7 at the end of the section reports p-values from Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, all of which are large.   
 
 
Figure 1:  Safe Choices by Decision Round, First Switch 
 
All 0% 10% 20% 30% 100%
Subjects 82 17 16 18 14 17
Mean 6.32 6.76 6.75 5.83 6.14 6.12
Median 7 7 7.5 5 5 6
Mode 10 7 8 4 5 6, 7
Table 4:  Safe Choices, First Switch, No Major Mistakes
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 Similarly, under the last switch assumption, if anything, Table 5 indicates decreasing risk 
aversion with higher probabilities of payment, though no significant differences exist.  Figure 2 
provides a graphical display of safe choices.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Safe Choices by Decision Round, Last Switch 
 
 Perhaps if we drop all mistakes entirely and only analyze the decisions of people who 
switch only once we will see some differences in treatments.  But perhaps not.  Table 6 reports 
summary statistics and Figure 3 displays the distributions of safe choices by treatment.  Again, if 
anything, it appears that subjects are becoming less risk averse as the probability of payment 
(and thus the expected payment) increases.  Again, no significant differences exist.   
All 0% 10% 20% 30% 100%
Subjects 82 17 16 18 14 17
Mean 7.66 8 7.63 7.78 7.29 7.53
Median 8 8 8 8 7.5 7
Mode 10 10 8, 10 10 10 7
Table 5:  Safe Choices, Last Switch, No Major Mistakes
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Figure 3:  Safe Choices by Decision Round, No Mistakes 
 
 As mentioned previously, Table 7 reports no significant differences by treatment, 
regardless of what assumption we make about simple mistakes, or whether or not they are 
included.  In one last attempt (not reported here), we included controls (age, gender, education, 
ethnicity, and income) and ran Ordered Probits, with and without income (as we did not have 
income data for all subjects).  Regardless of how we defined high education, how we defined 
high income, or if we included high income, treatment indicators were rarely significant and the 
Wald statistic was pitiful in all cases but one.  The 20% treatment indicator was weakly 
significant (p-values close to 0.10) every so often, and indicated more risk averse behavior than 
All 0% 10% 20% 30% 100%
Subjects 58 14 13 10 10 11
Mean 7.34 7.57 7.31 7.9 7 6.91
Median 8 7.5 8 9 7 7
Mode 10 7, 10 8 10 10 7
Table 6:  Safe Choices, Switch - No Mistakes
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that of subjects in the 100% treatment.  The other treatment indicators (0%, 10%, and 30%) were 
usually positive as well, though insignificant.   
 
 
4  Discussion 
 Well, we did find that low probabilities of payment can still achieve high levels of risk 
aversion when stakes are large – good news – but we also found the same degree of risk aversion 
with no probability of payment, regardless of the handling of mistakes – odd news.  However, 
our sample size is quite small.  Somewhat similar to these findings, in a low stakes environment, 
Laury (2006) finds that risk attitudes are identical whether one pays subjects for one randomly 
chosen decision out of ten or for all ten decisions; however, when one of ten higher stakes (10 
times the lower) decisions is randomly chosen, risk aversion is greater than in either of the low 
stakes treatments.  These results would suggest that stake size, rather than the probability of 
payment, is driving behavior.   
If such is always the case, however, then hypothetical high stakes should result in as 
much risk aversion as real high stakes.  However, the Holt and Laury (2002) findings, as well as 
Harrison et al’s comment (Harrison et al, 2005) and their reply (Holt and Laury, 2005) would 
suggest that subjects do not always focus solely on stake size.  When payments are hypothetical, 
0.971 0.404 0.378 0.248 0.754 0.852 0.383 0.409 1.000 0.491 0.573 0.343 WMW
1.000 0.234 0.277 0.694 1.000 0.922 0.870 0.694 1.000 0.643 0.699 0.662 KS
0.496 0.501 0.208 0.791 0.597 0.497 0.373 0.705 0.250 WMW
0.332 0.291 0.296 1.000 0.656 0.951 0.361 0.696 0.374 KS
0.802 0.690 0.547 0.470 0.408 0.209 WMW
0.807 0.234 0.925 0.650 0.972 0.211 KS
0.764 0.778 1.000 WMW
0.277 0.707 0.608 KS
Table 7:  Distribution Tests
p-values reported from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests.  
First Switch Last Switch Switch
20%
30%
0%
10% 30% 100%20%
10%
10% 20% 30% 100% 10% 20% 30% 100%
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stake size does not appear to matter in these experiments.  Additionally, Dickhaut et al (2009) 
found, by utilizing points instead of dollars in the experimental instructions, they could vary the 
degree of risk behavior such that even raising the point-stakes (rather than the dollar-stakes) 
increased risk aversion when payments were real, but failed to do so when payments were 
hypothetical.  Why then, do we find the same degree of risk aversion holding constant high 
stakes but varying the probability of payment from zero to one?   
One might be able to argue that in-person die rolls are less confusing than computerized 
card draws, which could potentially explain some differences in results.  For example, Harbaugh, 
Krause, and Vesterlund, test Prospect Theory’s four main predictions about risk attitudes 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) using two different risk elicitation techniques, one relatively 
simple (choosing between a lottery and its expected value) and one more complicated (naming 
the price one would be willing to pay to play (or avoid playing) a lottery).  They find that the 
more complicated elicitation method induces Prospect Theory’s predictions but that the simpler 
task induces random behavior, suggesting risk neutrality (Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund, 
2009).  In the simpler task, the expected payment is what counts.   
In Holt and Laury (2002), the expected payment is nothing in the hypothetical decisions 
and is increasing as stake size increases for other decisions.  In the experiment described here, 
the expected payment is nothing in the hypothetical treatment and increasing as the probability of 
payment increases since stake size is held constant.  If both were “simple” tasks, then according 
to the findings of Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund (2009), we should expect to see the same 
effects on risk aversion in both experiments as the expected payment increases (though not 
necessarily risk neutrality because stakes are much larger than in Harbaugh, Krause, and 
Vesterlund (2009), and the tasks are somewhat different).  If one task is more complicated than 
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another, we could see differences in behavior.  The fact that this experiment witnessed a large 
proportion of mistakes might suggest that this task was more complicated.  That is, if the mental 
cost of optimizing is great enough, we should expect to see many mistakes because people will 
optimize by failing to “optimize.”  Numerous authors have suggested that mistakes in 
experiments may not be mistakes if the expected cost of optimizing is greater than the expected 
benefit (for example, Smith and Walker, 1993, and Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, and Rutstrom, 
2005), which could help explain the incompletes and mistakes.  Perhaps the decision cost was 
too high for them.  As Camerer and Hogarth note, absent intrinsic motivation, “in many tasks 
incentives do not matter … because the task is too hard,” (1999).  However, even when omitting 
mistakes, we see little difference between the hypothetical and real treatments (and relatively 
little difference if we compare our real treatment to the Holt and Laury (2002) 20X treatment).   
Rather than assuming that one task was more complicated than another, we could 
alternatively posit that the “trainer” mentioned in Holt and Laury (2005, but also occurring in 
2002) and the paid practice round in the experiments by Dickhaut et al (2009), which are 
presumably teaching subjects not to make mistakes, may also be confounding interpretations of 
findings.  Perhaps it is exactly those subjects who would have made a mistake who vary their 
behavior when expected payments change, whereas the subjects who would not have made a 
mistake can provide a decent estimate of their “real” behavior even in a hypothetical setting.  As 
Jacobson and Petrie (2009) note in a paper relating risk aversion and mistakes to real financial 
decisions, mistakes can be revealing.  Discouraging them might simply trade one type of noise 
for another.  However, Harrison et al’s (2005) replication did not appear to include a trainer 
round and, as they note, mistakes (which occurred less than 20% of the time) did not affect their 
conclusions.   
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Finally, one key difference between this experiment and the others like it is that this 
experiment was run in an online, rather than a brick-and-mortar, laboratory.  When one has 
signed up to participate in an experiment and is sitting in the laboratory, the opportunity cost of 
taking one’s time to deliberate is relatively low – subjects rarely leave experiments early.  When 
one is sitting at one’s computer, the opportunity cost of staying and deliberating is arguably 
higher, which may have led to the large number of mistakes.  Why it would have led to the same 
degree of risk aversion in hypothetical and real treatments is not exactly clear.  Perhaps the cost 
weeded out the extrinsically motivated subjects, leaving only those subjects who were 
intrinsically motivated to think about how they would have behaved had the task been real, 
yielding similar responses in all treatments, regardless of the probability of payment.   
 
5  Concluding Remarks 
Though the sample size was relatively small, especially after dropping all mistakes, the 
results found here indicate that there may be instances in which low probabilities of high stakes 
can elicit risk behavior consistent with that elicited by high real stakes, but additional 
experiments are required.   
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Appendix:  Experiment Screens 
Unless necessary, the screens below will display those of the 20% treatment.  In the other 
treatments, “20%” would be replaced with “10%” or “30%”; or “a 20% chance for additional 
payment” or “possible additional payment” would be “a hypothetical payment” (0% treatment) 
or “an additional payment” (in the 100% treatment).   
 
Screen 1, part 1, Real (100%) 
 
 
Screen 1, part1, Hypothetical (0%) 
 
 
Screen 1, part 1, 20% treatment 
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Screen 1, part 2, 20% treatment (similar for other treatments) 
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Screen 1, part 3, 20% treatment 
 
 
Screen 1, part 3, Hypothetical 
 
 
Screen 1, part 3, Real 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
Screen 2, All treatments 
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Screen 3, All treatments 
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Screen 4, 20% treatment (similar for other treatments) 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
Screen 5 appeared in the 10%, 20%, and 30% treatments only.   
 
Screen 5, 20% treatment (similar for 10% and 30%) 
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The following screens appeared in all treatments.   
 
Survey screens 
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Conclusion Screen 
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CONCLUSION 
  
In recent years we have seen that nonprofit organizations increasingly offer donors new 
and interesting ways to contribute.  Many of these new solicitation methods frame charitable 
donations (of money) as charitable gifts, and charitable gifts as alternatives to traditional gifts.  
Through charitable gift catalogues, containing pictures, descriptions, choices, and prices, donors 
are able to go shopping for charitable gifts for the recipients of a charity’s funds, as well as for 
friends, family, and acquaintances (by contributing gifts in their honor, as replacements for 
traditional gifts).  My dissertation utilized laboratory experiments to examine the causes and 
consequences of providing donors with these new ways to contribute.  In the first chapter, I 
found evidence that a mental distinction exists between donating money and purchasing a 
charitable gift.  I controlled for two salient components of a gift purchase – choice and prices – 
and found that their interaction yields significant effects on giving, though the sign of these 
effects depends upon the age of the donor.  Older donors appear to prefer donations (of cash) and 
younger donors appear to prefer giving charitable gifts.  In the second chapter, I found evidence 
that nonprofits are able to successfully frame a charitable gift purchase as a viable substitute for 
or addition to a Valentine’s Day gift by allowing donors to contribute a charitable gift in honor 
of somebody special to them.  The added effect of the Valentine frame is positive for younger 
donors and negative for older donors.  In the third chapter, I addressed an experiment design 
question that was raised while conducting pilot experiments for the first chapter: Is stake size or 
the probability of payment more salient to experiment subjects?  I found that stake size appears 
to be more influential, though additional experiments are needed to confirm this result.   
